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I. INTRODUCTION: "THE F.B.I. MESSES UP"
On March 11, 2004, terrorists affiliated with the Al Qaida
networkl detonated bombs on four commuter trains in Madrid, Spain,
killing 191 people and injuring 2,000 others.1 Hours later, the Spanish
National Police (SNP) recovered a fingerprint from a bag of detonators
found in a stolen van parked at a station from which three of the
bombed trains departed. 2 The SNP requested assistance from the
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation to identify the owner of
the print. 3 FBI experts concluded that the print belonged to Brandon
Mayfield, a U.S. citizen living in a suburb of Portland, Oregon, and the
4
agency began investigating and surveilling him.
Weeks later, the federal agents watching Mr. Mayfield, an
immigration and family law attorney, still did not believe they had
sufficient evidence of wrongdoing to charge him with any crime. The
agents, however, feared that he would become aware of their
investigation and flee. 5 To prevent this, the FBI and the U.S.
Attorney's Office sought a "material witness" warrant for Mr.
Mayfield's arrest from a federal judge. 6 In the affidavit supporting the
warrant application, the FBI claimed it had made a "100% positive
identification" to fingerprints on file from Mr. Mayfield's eight years of
service in the U.S. armed forces. 7 Because there was no record that
Mr. Mayfield had ever left the country, the FBI alleged in the affidavit
8
that he might have traveled to Spain using false documents.
Although Spanish officials had expressed grave doubts about the FBI's
claimed match, the FBI claimed in the affidavit that "it was believed"
that the SNP's doubts had been resolved. 9 The affidavit also included
a series of other claims to insinuate Mr. Mayfield's alleged links to
terrorists, including that Mr. Mayfield was the attorney in a child
custody case to a man who later pled guilty to conspiring to help All. See Sarah Kershaw, Lawyer Linked to Bombings Is Released, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2004,
at A14.
2.
See Susan Schmidt & Blaine Harden, Lawyer's Fingerprint Linked to Bombing; Bag,
DetonatorsFound in Stolen Van in Spain, WASH. POST, May 8, 2004, at A3.
3.
See Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Spain Had Doubts Before U.S. Held Lawyer in
Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at Al.
4.
See Sarah Kershaw & David Johnston, Arrest in Bombing Inquiry Was Rushed,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004, at A12.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Werner Affidavit, Application for Material Witness Order and Warrant Regarding
Witness: Brandon Bieri Mayfield 8, In re Federal Grand Jury 03-01 (D. Or.) (No. 04-MC-9071)
(on file with author).
8.
Id. 23.
9.
Id. 8.
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Qaida and the Taliban.' 0 Based on these representations, Judge
Robert Jones issued a sealed warrant for Mr. Mayfield's arrest and the
FBI arrested him as a "material witness" on May 6, 2004.11
The assistant federal public defender appointed to represent
Mr. Mayfield argued for his client's release on the ground that the
government was detaining Mr. Mayfield not because he was a witness
but rather to investigate him as a criminal suspect. 12 In its four-page
response, the government candidly admitted that it was doing
precisely that: "Based on the evidence collected to date, the
government cannot exclude the possibility that Mayfield was
criminally, rather than innocently, involved in how his fingerprint got
to Spain."' 3 The government's position was that there was nothing
illegal about holding Mr. Mayfield in jail as a "material witness" while
it investigated him.
Meanwhile (and fortunately for Mr. Mayfield), the SNP
remained skeptical of the FBI's claimed fingerprint match. Within a
few days, the SNP independently determined that Brandon Mayfield's
print had never, in fact, been in Spain. The recovered fingerprint
actually belonged to an Algerian man, Daoud Ouhnane.14 Though
never charged with any crime, Mr. Mayfield had been jailed for two
weeks before being exonerated of any involvement in the bombing and
released on May 20, 2004. For the first week of his imprisonment, he
was kept in solitary confinement and regularly strip-searched. 5 Even
after his release, Mr. Mayfield remained a "material witness" under
10. Kershaw & Lichtblau, supra note 3. The affidavit also noted that Mr. Mayfield was
married to a naturalized citizen of Egyptian origin, that his wife had spoken on the telephone
with the director of an Oregon foundation said to have terrorist ties, and that Mr. Mayfield
advertised his law practice in a business directory allegedly overseen by an individual linked to
11, 15-16, 18, 20.
the former personal secretary of Osama Bin Laden. Werner Affidavit,
11. Executed Warrant for Arrest of Material Witness, In re Federal Grand Jury 03-01 (D.
Or.) (No. 04-MC-9071) (on file with author). That same day, the FBI also sought and obtained
from Judge Jones warrants to search Mr. Mayfield's law office and his family's home and cars.
Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant (D. Or.) (No. 04-MC-9071) (on file with author);
Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant, In re Federal Grand Jury 03-01 (D. Or.) (No. 04MC-9071) (on file with author). A few days later, they obtained a warrant to search the
Mayfields' safety deposit box. Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant (D. Or.) (No. 04-MC9071) (on file with author).
12. Memorandum of Authority in Support of Emergency Motion for Release of Material
Witness and Emergency Motion for Release of Material Witness at 9-11, In re Federal Grand
Jury 03-01 (D. Or.) (No. 04-MC-9071) (on file with author).
13. Government's Response and Opposition to Emergency Motion for Release of Material
Witness at 3, In re Federal Grand Jury 03-01 (D. Or.) (No. 04-MC-9071) (on file with author).
14. Sarah Kershaw et al., Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y. Times,
June 5, 2004, at Al, A13; Susan Schmidt & Blaine Harden, Lawyer is Cleared Of Ties to
Bombings, Wash. Post, May 25, 2004, at A2.
15. Tomas Alex Tizon, A Fuzzy Fingerprint Leaves a Lasting Mark, L.A. TIMES, May 29,
2004, at Al.

680

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:677

court-supervised release for three more days while FBI examiners
traveled to Madrid to confirm their error.1 6 The government then filed
a motion stating, "[T]here is no longer probably [sic] cause to believe
that Mayfield is in possession of information material to a criminal
proceeding. .".."17 The FBI issued a rare public apology to Mr.
Mayfield,1 8 who sued the government anyway. 19 A few months later, a
panel of seven international forensic experts charged by the FBI with
investigating Mr. Mayfield's arrest concluded that the agency's
intimidating institutional culture discouraged anyone from second20
guessing the faulty fingerprint match.
Frighteningly, Brandon Mayfield's case is not an isolated
incident. Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon of September 11, 2001, the United States Department of
Justice has obtained "material witness" warrants to arrest (as far as is
known) about fifty individuals. Like Mr. Mayfield, these so-called
"material witnesses," though charged with no crime, have been
secretly held in the highest-security federal prisons while authorities
investigated whether they had terrorist ties.
The press seized upon the FBI's internationally embarrassing
gaffe to criticize the secret imprisonment of these "material witnesses"
in the investigation of terrorism. "The case smacks of a rush to
judgment based on flimsy evidence," said a New York Times
editorial. 2 1 "It is sobering evidence that the current legal crackdown on
22
suspected terrorists can yield injustice for those who are innocent."
The Washington Post criticized the government for misusing the
material witness statute to incarcerate suspects: "In Mr. Mayfield's
case, the government's use of the law allowed the detention and public
smearing of a man against whom the government was not prepared to
make a case and whom it now concedes to be innocent." 23 In two
16. Schmidt & Harden, supra note 14, at A2; Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Questions
About Evidence In U.S. Arrest in Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A14; Kershaw, Lawyer
Linked, supra note 1, at A14.
17. Motion to Dismiss Material Witness Proceeding at 3, In re Federal Grand Jury 03-01 (D.
Or.) (No. 04-MC-9071) (on file with author).
18. Kershaw et al., supra note 14, at Al.
19. Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights, Mayfield v. Ashcroft (No. CV-04-1427-AA) (on
file with author).
20. Blaine Harden, FBI Faulted in Arrest of Ore. Lawyer; Study by Forensic Experts Cites
Mistakes in FingerprintIdentification, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2004, at A2.
21. Editorial, The F.B.I.Messes Up, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A22.
22. Id.
23. Editorial, Apology Is Not Enough, WASH. POST, May 27, 2004, at A30 [hereinafter
Apology]. In a New York Times article, the executive director of Oregon's American Civil
Liberties Union similarly decried the DOJ's abuse of the statute: "The Justice Department is
using the material witness statute in a way that it was never meant to be used, and this is just
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editorials, The Post called for Congress to curtail the Department of
Justice's aggressive use of "material witness" arrest warrants and "to
clarify the new circumstances under which the material-witness law
24
should apply."
Even in light of the Department of Justice's systematic and
secret detention of "material witnesses," the federal courts, the media,
and legal academics have assumed that this practice does not violate
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures.
As a result, criticism has been limited to a fallback argument: it may
be legal to arrest and detain true material witnesses, but it is not legal
to effect pretextual investigatory arrests of potential suspects as
"material witnesses." The assumption that at least some material
witness incarcerations must be constitutional is based on a
combination of flawed historical analysis and flawed legal reasoning.
This assumption is premised on the myth that the incarceration of
material witnesses has been uncontroversially practiced since the time
of the Founding-and even sanctioned by the Founders themselves.
This myth has led to a misreading of a handful of Supreme Court
cases that are said to expressly approve the incarceration of innocent
witnesses. The Founders in fact never sanctioned such a practice and
the Supreme Court has never approved it.
The few publicized accounts of "material witness" detentions
since September 11th, some of which are discussed in this Article,
demonstrate the need to debunk the notion that the government can
indefinitely imprison people accused of no crime. To illustrate the
extent of the practice culminating in Brandon Mayfield's arrest, Part
II examines the federal government's unprecedented and calculated
reliance on the material witness statute in its post-September 11th
terrorism investigation. Part III reviews legal scholarship both on the
practice of detaining "material witnesses" in general and on the
government's more aggressive use of the tactic since September 11th.
Laboring under the misapprehension that the incarceration of
witnesses has long been held constitutional, legal commentators as
well as advocates like Brandon Mayfield's attorney have merely
echoed the mainstream media's complaint that DOJ is misusing the
material witness statute. As a result, DOJ's arrests of many innocent
people are made to seem heavy-handed, but legitimate. Part IV
explores the root of the fallacy that incarcerating "material witnesses"
has been deemed constitutional since the eighteenth century. Much of
the most dramatic example of that trend." Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Bomb Case Against
Lawyer is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2004, at A16.
24. Editorial, Arresting Witnesses, WASH. POST, May 22, 2004, at A26; Apology, supra note
23, at A30.
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the blame for this belief is attributable to Bacon v. United States,25 a
1971 Ninth Circuit case whose flaccid reasoning has to this day
deprived anyone labeled a "material witness" of the Fourth
Amendment's protection. Part V examines the few federal court
decisions ruling on the legality of detaining "material witnesses" in
connection with the September 11th investigation and the authorities
on which they rely. Bacon's pernicious influence is reflected in these
decisions. Moreover, these cases carelessly misread and misapply
Supreme Court decisions that, rather than supporting the
incarceration of witnesses, make clear that the practice has never
been approved and is at best of dubious constitutionality. Finally, Part
VI examines the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
to show that imprisoning individuals without sufficient evidence of
their involvement in criminal activity is necessarily unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.

II. '"MATERIAL WITNESS" ARRESTS IN THE SEPTEMBER 11TH DRAGNET
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
Attorney General John Ashcroft directed federal law enforcement
agencies to use 'every available law enforcement tool' to arrest those
who "'participate in, or lend support to, terrorist activities."'' 26 Because
it lacked reliable intelligence regarding potential terrorists in the
United States, the Department adopted a policy of detaining all
suspicious individuals on technical bases. 27 Strict enforcement of
minor immigration violations that had previously gone unenforced
provided justification for the majority of the arrests. 28 But not every

25.

449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
26. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 1 (2003) [hereinafter

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REVIEW] (quoting Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to
United States Attorneys entitled "Anti-Terrorism Plan" (Sept. 17, 2001)), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/O306/index.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
27. In a speech on October 25, 2001, the Attorney General said:
Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa-even by one daywe will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept in
custody as long as possible. We will use every available statute. We will seek every
prosecutorial advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and under the
Constitution to protect life and enhance security for America.
Id. at 12 (quoting Attorney General's speech to U.S. Conference of Mayors (Oct. 25, 2001)).
28. See id. at 13, 41 (quoting one government official as saying "she understood that the
Department [of Justice] was detaining aliens on immigration violations that generally had not
been enforced in the past" and stating that "[iut is unlikely that most if not all of the individuals
arrested [for immigration violations during the Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombing (PENTTBOM)
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person whom agents deemed suspicious had violated an immigration
regulation; indeed, some were American citizens. In those cases,
federal authorities needed another means to legitimate detention. The
solution was to arrest and imprison such suspicious people under the
federal material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, as witnesses to the
grand juries convened in connection with the terrorism investigation.
Enacted in 1984, Section 3144 purports to authorize the arrest
and detention of an innocent individual on the ground that he or she is
needed as a witness in some criminal proceeding. The only
prerequisites to the arrest of such a person are: (1) the filing of an
affidavit by a party stating that the witness's testimony is material to
a criminal proceeding and (2) a showing that it "may become
impracticable" to secure the witness with a subpoena.2 9 There is no
requirement that the party seeking arrest so much as attempt to serve
a subpoena or demonstrate that exigent circumstances require swift
30
action before obtaining an arrest warrant.
A witness who has been served with a subpoena or who
knowingly and willfully attempts to evade service of procegs is not the
obvious or archetypical target of this statute. Courts can deal with
such witnesses with their contempt power, and there is another
31
federal statute specifically addressing the "recalcitrant witness."
Rather, Section 3144 targets those people who the government or a
criminal defendant believes have material information and may not
appear voluntarily. "Material" is not defined but rather is left to the
judgment of the party requesting the warrant and the judge signing it.
More importantly, no standards govern what evidence of the witness's
refusal to testify must be adduced. The witness need not have done
anything to avoid process. Indeed, the statute does not require even an

investigation] would have been pursued by law enforcement authorities for these ... violations
but for the PENTTBOM investigation").
29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (2005).
30. The statute provides:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material
in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure
the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the
person and treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title
[the Bail Reform Act of 1984]. No material witness may be detained because of inability
to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately
be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of
justice. Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time
until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Id.
31. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826 (2005).
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attempt to serve process. The witness may be totally unaware that his
or her testimony is desired in any proceeding.
The statute further provides that, once arrested, the witness
will be "treated" under 18 U.S.C. § 3142, the same statute used to
determine the conditions of pretrial release for criminal defendants.
The least onerous terms of release that Section 3142 authorizes are
release "on personal recognizance, or upon execution of an unsecured
appearance bond in an amount specified by the court, subject to the
condition that the person not commit a Federal, State, or local crime
during the period of release .... " 32 If the presiding judicial officer
determines that further conditions are necessary to "reasonably
assure the appearance of the person" or that the person poses a
danger to another person or the community, the judge can impose
additional conditions of release. 33 These conditions may include being
placed in the custody of a particular person, maintaining or seeking
employment, abiding by travel or residential restrictions, avoiding
contact with certain others having knowledge about the case,
reporting to a law enforcement or pretrial services agency, complying
with a curfew, posting bail, or being placed in home detention. 34
Finally, the judicial officer may order that the person be held in
custody without possibility of release until the case is resolved. 35
32. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(b) (2005).
33. The legislative history of Section 3144 states, "Of course a material witness is not to be
detained on the basis of dangerousness." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3211 n.100. However, the statute itself does not state that. Moreover,
the fact that at least some of those arrested under this statute after September 11th were placed
in high-security confinement strongly suggests that presumed dangerousness was a factor in
their incarceration.
34. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2005). The Act provides that "[tihe judicial officer may not
impose a financial condition that results in the pre-trial detention of the person." 18 U.S.C.A. §
3142(c)(2) (2005). The courts of appeals have held that this provision does not prevent a judge
from setting bail in an amount the prisoner cannot afford. See, e.g., United States v. McConnell,
842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A] bail setting is not constitutionally excessive merely
because a defendant is financially unable to satisfy the requirement."); United States v. WongAlvarez, 799 F.2d 583, 584 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[Defendant] contends that if a pretrial detainee
cannot make the financial provisions of a bond he is then held in detention in violation of [18
U.S.C. § 3142(c)]. We reject this sweeping contention."); United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378,
388 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that the "threat to the safety of the community [posed by the
defendant] ... if released," rather than his inability to post bail, is the cause of his continued
detention and thus that said detention does not violate 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)). Thus, the financial
condition could result in material witnesses being imprisoned pending resolution of the case.
Though nothing is known about the majority of material witness detentions after September
11th, the government requested detention without any provision for bail in every case that has
come to light, many of which are described in this Section.
35. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e) (2005). The statute makes pretrial detention an option depending
upon the nature of the case, not the nature of the arrestee.Id.; United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7,
11 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3142 indicates that the
"circumstances for invoking a detention hearing in effect serve to limit the types of cases in
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To satisfy the statute's requirements in the September 11th
dragnet, federal agents routinely claimed that individuals targeted for
detention had information material to the grand jury investigations in
New York and Virginia of the September 11th terrorist attacks.
Federal district and magistrate judges granted prosecutors' requests
to hold such witnesses in custody for weeks, as in Brandon Mayfield's
case, or even months. These courts effectively allowed the government
to imprison indefinitely suspicious individuals on scant or no evidence
of wrongdoing until federal agents were satisfied of their innocence or
had gathered sufficient evidence to support a charge. The government
also was able to interrogate these individuals through grand jury
36
proceedings for the purpose of developing investigatory leads.
Perhaps as alarming as the detentions themselves is the fact
that DOJ has to date kept secret the identities, characteristics, and
circumstances of those held as "material witnesses" and has
vigorously resisted every effort at uncovering any information about
them. As a result, virtually nothing is known about the treatment of
most of the "material witness" detainees, and public scrutiny has been
greatly limited. The court files relating to the known "material
witness" detentions are under seal (at the request of prosecutors), and
there may exist any number of cases of which there is no public record
whatsoever.
Civil liberties and news organizations sued DOJ in December
2001 under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain information
identifying everyone detained in the September l1th investigation,
the names of the attorneys representing them, and other data.3 7 While
DOJ released some information regarding those held on immigration
and criminal charges, "It]he government withheld all requested
information with respect to material witnesses." 38 The government's
principal arguments were that releasing any information about the
"material witnesses" would interfere with the September 11th
investigation and that grand jury secrecy rules and court orders

which detention may be ordered prior to trial"); United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3d
Cir. 1986) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3142 does not "authorize pretrial detention upon proof of
danger to the community other than from those offenses which will support a motion for
detention" under Section 3142(e)).
36. See Rachel Stevens, Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department
of Justice: Keeping the USA PATRIOT Act in Check One Material Witness at a Time, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 2157, 2164-67 (2003) (explaining how the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 amended grand jury
rules to allow prosecutors to share some grand jury testimony with federal law enforcement
agencies).
37. Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
[hereinafter CenterI1].
38. Id.
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barred its production. 39 Th district court rejected these contentions,
noting that the names of twenty-six "material witnesses" had been
published (some by DOJ itself) and that at least a few of those
40
arrested were released without ever testifying before any grand jury.
The court further stated:
[The Government's treatment of material witness information is deeply troubling. A
person apprehended as a material witness is not accused of any crime but, instead, has
been arrested because it is believed that his or her "testimony is material in a criminal
proceeding." ... Nevertheless, the Government has kept secret virtually everything
about these individuals, including the number of people arrested and detained, as well
as their identities. The public has no idea whether
there are 40, 400, or possibly more
41
people in detention on material witness warrants.

Refusing to second-guess the government's claimed need for
secrecy, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's order requiring
the government to produce either the names of those detained as
"material witnesses" or court orders demonstrating it could not legally
do so. 42 The appellate court held that the district court had not been
sufficiently deferential to the Executive Branch's contention that
disclosing any of the requested information could hamper the
September 11th investigation: "We have consistently reiterated the
principle of deference to the executive in the FOIA context when
national security concerns are implicated." 43 Applying this deferential
(that is to say, credulous) standard of review, the appellate court
found the government's refusal to provide the information
reasonable. 44 Accordingly, the court did not address the government's
other grounds for withholding the information. The Supreme Court
45
denied review.
So reticent has DOJ been to say anything about the "material
witnesses" that even when pointedly questioned by the House of
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, the Department refused
to disclose any details about the "material witness" detainees-not
even their exact number. DOJ's report to the committee stated only
that as of January 2003 "fewer than 50" individuals had been detained
4 6 Of
as "material witnesses" in the September 11th investigation.

39. Id. at 922-23.
40. Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp.2d 94, 107 (D.D.C. 2002)
[hereinafter Center 1].
41. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
42. Center I, 331 F.3d at 937.
43. Id. at 927.
44. Id. at 925-33.
45. Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
46. Letter from Jamie E. Brown, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Office of Legislative Affairs, to Reps. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. and John Conyers, Jr., House
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course, this was not exactly a revelation, as The Washington Post had
already reported that forty-four individuals had been held as
"material witnesses", seven of the forty-four were United States
citizens, half had not been called to testify in any proceeding, and
twenty-nine were released without being charged with a crime. 47 The
fact that most of the "material witnesses" were released without ever
being charged with any crime suggests that DOJ's dragnet
48
indiscriminately cast people into federal prisons.
The Department gave Congress the same explanation for
refusing to disclose this information that it had given the D.C. Circuit;
it argued that disclosure would hamper the September 11th
investigation and violate the law:
With respect to the request for details about material witnesses detained during
terrorism investigations, the Department of Justice has consistently taken the view that
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) and court orders in individual cases prohibit it
from revealing the exact numbers of material witnesses who are detained pending their
testimony before a grand jury. The Department also cannot reveal the details of cases,
as that would reveal the direction and focus of secret grand jury proceedings. In
addition, disclosing such specific information would be detrimental to the war on terror
and the investigation of the September 11 attacks. Thus, it continues to be imperative
that the specific number of material witnesses detained as part of the September 11
investigation, the districts and 9investigations to which they relate, and the length of
4
their detention not be released.

It is doubtful that Rule 6(e) prevents the government from
divulging the identity of individuals arrested as "material witnesses"
and certain that it does not prevent the government from divulging
the names of those who were released without testifying. 50 The
Department's claim that court orders prevented it from divulging the
information is even thinner. DOJ itself requested every such sealing
order on an ex parte basis at the same time that it requested each
"material witness" arrest warrant. 51 The orders, as well as the
of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary 50 (May 13, 2003) [hereinafter Justice PATRIOT
Report] (on file with author).
47. Steve Fainaru & Margot Williams, Material Witness Law Has Many in Limbo, WASH.
POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at Al, A12.
48. Id.
49. Justice PATRIOT Report, supra note 46, at 49. Interestingly, the Department also
refused to provide Congress with the witnesses' national origin, race, or ethnicity, claiming that
it did "not maintain data on these characteristics of detained material witnesses." Id. at 50.
Presumably, this information could be compiled in short order for fewer than 50 people. The
DOJ's Office of Inspector General was able to learn the age and nationality of all 762 people
detained after September 11 for purported immigration violations. See INSPECTOR GENERAL'S
REVIEW, supranote 26, at 21 fig.1-3 (providing demographics for September 11 detainees).
50. See Center I, 215 F. Supp.2d 94, 106-07 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Center II, 331 F.3d 918,
948-49 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
51. For example, the government filed the application for Brandon Mayfield's arrest
warrant under seal. Werner Affidavit, Application for Material Witness Order and Warrant
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warrants, were obtained- on the basis of the government's
unchallenged allegations. Because the proceedings were not in any
sense adversarial, DOJ's assurance to the Judiciary Committee that
"[e]very single person detained as a material witness as part of the
September 11 investigations was found by a federal judge to have
information material to the grand jury's investigation" has little
52
meaning.
Perhaps realizing that DOJ was itself responsible for
shrouding the "material witness" detentions in secrecy, the Judiciary
Committee requested the government's motions to seal each "material
witness" proceeding and the sealing orders. Tellingly, DOJ refused to
provide those documents as well:
We are prohibited by court orders from providing any information regarding specific
sealed material witness proceedings, including copies of sealing orders. We routinely
move to seal all grand jury material5 witness
proceedings pursuant to Rule 6(e) of the
3
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

DOJ also claimed that, because Rule 6(e) does not impose a
secrecy obligation on grand jury witnesses, "each of the detained
material witnesses is free to identify himself publicly. The fact that
few have elected to do so suggests they wish their detention to remain
non-public. '' 54 In fact, all available evidence indicates that the
detainees and their lawyers are prevented from speaking because of
the conditions of confinement or because of the sealing orders the
55
Department obtained and refuses to disclose.
Regarding Witness: Brandon Bieri Mayfield 8, In re Federal Grand Jury 03-01 (D. Or.) (No. 04MC-9071) (on file with author). Judge Jones ordered it unsealed on June 17, 2004, after Mr.
Mayfield had been released. Record of Order, In re: Federal Grand Jury 03-01 (D. Or.) (No. 04MC-9071) (on file with author).
52. Justice PATRIOT Report, supra note 46, at 48. Indeed, this claim of active judicial
oversight is one the Department has repeatedly made. Attorney General John Ashcroft was
quoted as saying that "[p]eople who are detained as material witnesses are detained by federal
judges." Andrew Kramer, Ashcroft Hails Work of Area's Authorities, COLUMBIAN (CLARK COUNTY,
WASH.), July 19, 2003, at Al. A Justice Department spokesman assured a reporter, "There are
safeguards in place and the government follows those safeguards to the letter." Rose Ciotta,
Critics See Abuse of Material-Witness Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 4, 2003, at A5. Ironically, the
D.C. Circuit relied on this empty assurance as support for its conclusion that the judiciary should
be highly deferential to the Executive Branch on national security matters. See Center II, 331
F.3d at 931 ("[M]aterial witness detainees have been found by a federal judge to have relevant
knowledge about the terrorism investigation.").
53. Justice PATRIOT Report, supra note 46, at 51 (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at 49.
55. See Stevens, supra note 36, at 2161 ("The contention that detainees can self-identify,
however, is inconsistent with reports of the conditions in which the government holds many of
the detainees,"); Dan Christensen, Secrecy Appealed, DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW (Miami), Sept. 25,
2003, at Al(stating that neither Mohammed Bellahouel nor his lawyer could discuss the case in
detail due to gag order); Daniel de Vise, Case Galvanizes Opponents of U.S. Secrecy, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 19, 2004, at A5 (same); Kershaw, supra note 1, at A14 (quoting Brandon Mayfield's
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While the details of many cases are still unknown because of
DOJ's efforts, it appears that federal judges generally deferred to law
enforcement agents' and prosecutors' requests in the September 11th
investigation for "material witness" detentions without bail. Most of
the warrants and sealing orders were apparently obtained in the
Southern District of New York or in the Eastern District of Virginia
where grand juries were convened to investigate the terrorist attacks.
The warrants were then enforced in other districts, wherever a
"material witness" was found. This left the judge in the enforcing
district with only the narrow task of performing a "removal hearing"
- one in which the government must prove only the identity of the
person who is the subject of the warrant. 56 All other issues could be
litigated only in the district from which the warrant issued. 57 As a
practical matter, the target of a "material witness" warrant had little
or no opportunity to challenge his or her arrest until he or she was
transported in shackles to New York or Virginia. The judge approving
the transfer had no occasion to consider the legality of the arrest
warrant or the sealing order.
The story of Mohammed Bellahouel's detention shows as
starkly as that of Brandon Mayfield how judges have authorized
''material witness" detentions on unsubstantiated allegations and
deferred to prosecutors' claims regarding the need for secrecy. In
October 2001, federal agents arrested Mr. Bellahouel, an Algerian
immigrant working as a waiter at a restaurant in a South Florida
strip mall. The affidavit filed in support of the government's
application for a "material witness" arrest warrant alleged that Mr.
Bellahouel had seen a movie in that mall with one of the September
11th terrorists. The source of this information was purportedly an
unidentified employee of the movie theatre. 58 The affidavit speculated:
"It is likely that Bellahouel would have waited on both [Mohammed]
Atta and [Marwan] al Shehhi since Bellahouel had worked at the
wife as stating that Mr. Mayfield and his lawyers were barred by court order from discussing the
case); Rachel L. Swarns, Muslims Protest Monthlong Detention Without a Charge, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2003, at A16 (noting that the judge barred Maher Hawash's lawyers from discussing
case and lawyers advised wife not to discuss it).
56. FED R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(3)(D).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 499 F.2d 538, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The upshot of
it all is that once a certified copy of the indictment is produced at a removal hearing, the only
issue remaining litigable is the identity of the arrestee as the indictee."); In re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d
954, 957 (1st Cir. 1971) (holding petitioner had no right to challenge legality of wire tap in
removal proceeding); United States v. Provoo, 16 F.R.D. 341, 343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (holding
that indicted defendant could not contest probable cause at removal hearing).
58. Dan Christensen, Low Burden of Proof Coincidence, UncorroboratedReport Enough To
Get Arab Waiter in South Florida Detained Five Months, DAILY BUS. REV. (Miami), Mar. 14,
2003, at Al; Christensen, supra note 55.
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restaurant for 10 months, and both Atta and al Shehhi were frequent
patrons during shifts that Bellahouel worked." 59 The affidavit went on
to reveal candidly (if inadvertently) that the FBI had no real reason to
suspect Mr. Bellahouel of any wrongdoing. It stated: "In the
meantime, the FBI has been unable to rule out the possibility that the
respondent is somehow linked to, or possesses knowledge of, the
terrorist attacks. 6 0
Despite an affidavit setting forth nothing but conjecture,
relying on an undisclosed source, and conceding that the government
had no idea whether Mr. Bellahouel had any useful information, a
judge in Virginia issued a warrant for his arrest as a "material
witness" to the September 11th attacks. The unsupported inferential
leap that Mr. Bellahouel must have waited on two of the September
11th terrorists is as senseless as the FBI's contention in Mr.
Mayfield's case that, because there was no record of Mr. Mayfield
traveling to Spain, he must have done so under a false identity. 61 And,
just as the FBI's reason for incarcerating Mr. Bellahouel was that it
had "been unable to rule out" any possible terrorist ties, the
government argued three years later that it could not "exclude the
possibility that Mayfield was criminally" involved in the Spain
62
bombings.
As nsettling as the fact that Mr. Bellahouel was incarcerated
on such thin allegations were the lengths to which the executive and
judicial branches of the government went to keep the entire incident
from the public. Mr. Bellahouel was secretly held in custody for five
months. He was released around March 2002 after testifying before
the grand jury in Virginia and being cleared of terrorist links. During
his time in custody, Mr. Bellahouel filed in the Southern District of
Florida a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his
detention. Even though the case continued to be litigated after Mr.
Bellahouel's release, it was never docketed by either the district court
or the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Not only were all the filings
sealed, but the very existence of a case was kept secret. It was
discovered only because a clerk inadvertently published the case name
on a list of scheduled oral arguments, and a reporter realized that the
59. Christensen, supra note 58 (alteration in original).
60. Id.
61. See Werner Affidavit, Application for Material Witness Order and Warrant Regarding
Witness: Brandon Bieri Mayfield 23, In re Federal Grand Jury 03-01 (D. Or.) (No. 04-MC-9071)
(on file with author) (suggesting that Mr. Mayfield traveled under a false name or false
documentation).
62. Memorandum of Authority in Support of Emergency Motion for Release of Material
Witness and Emergency Motion for Release of Material Witness at 9-11, In re Federal Grand
Jury 03-01 (D. Or.) (No. 04-MC-9071) (on file with author).
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case was mysteriously not docketed in either the trial or appellate
court.

63

Once Mr. Bellahouel's attorneys petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari, the story of his arrest was widely publicized in
newspapers across the country. 64 Even though the facts of the case
had been widely reported, the government fought to keep the entire
matter sealed and asked to file even its response to the certiorari
petition under seal. 65 By then, Mr. Bellahouel had been living freely in
Florida for months and had never been charged with any crime. The
Court in fact did keep most of Mr. Bellahouel's petition and most of
the government's opposition under seal and ultimately denied
66
review.
DOJ's own investigation into the treatment of those arrested
after September 11th for immigration violations suggests that the
government's insistence on secrecy is motivated by its desire to limit
public scrutiny of the bases for "material witness" arrests. The DOJ
Office of Inspector General's report, which is highly critical of the
treatment of immigration detainees, provides important insights into
the government's systematic reliance on "material witness" arrest
warrants. It describes an indiscriminate dragnet that ensnared nearly
800 individuals, almost none of whom had any terrorist ties. Given the
potentially disastrous consequences of letting any possible terrorist
remain at large after September 11th and the lack of reliable
63. Dan Christensen, Secrecy Within: Algerian Native's Federal Appeal in Miami Has Court
Altering Records, Closing Hearing in Name of Security, DAILY Bus. REV. (Miami), Mar. 12, 2003
at Al.
64. See Dan Christensen, Plea for Openness, National Press Group Asks U.S. Supreme
Court to Unseal Case Files of Broward Man Imprisoned After Sept. 11 Attacks, DAILY Bus. REV.
(Miami), Nov. 5, 2003, at Al (commenting additionally on the amicus brief filed by the Reporters
Committee for the Freedom of the Press seeking to have the sealed judgment declared
unconstitutional); Christensen, supra note 55 (emphasizing that even the public copy of Mr.
Bellahouel's petition for certiorari was heavily redacted); Marcia Coyle, U.S. Told To Defend
Secret Court Actions: High Court Acts on Algerian's Petition, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 10, 2003 at 1, 1, 17
(explaining how the distance from September 11th and the Bush administration's reliance on
secrecy might cause the Court to take Mr. Bellahouel's case); Charles Lane, White House Told To
Justify Secrecy: High Court Issues Order in Terror Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2003, at A6
(reporting the Court's request that Solicitor General Olson respond to Bellahouel's constitutional
challenge and distinguishing the case from earlier challenges to the administration's secrecy in
terrorism-related cases).
65. United States' Motion for Leave to File Brief in Opposition with Appendix Under Seal,
M.K.B. v. Warden, 540 U.S. 1213 (2004) (No. 03-6747), available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/terrorism/mkbwardenl05O4sgmot.pdf; see also Gina Holland, Bush Administration
Wants Entire 9/11 Case Kept Secret: Immigrant Contests His Jailing and Secrecy of Proceedings,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at 46 (noting that Solicitor General Olson's request to keep the
case sealed was one paragraph long); U.S. Requests Secrecy in 9/11 Detainee's Case, WASH. POST,
Jan. 6, 2004, at A10 (same).
66. M.K.B. v. Warden, 540 U.S. 1213, 1213 (2004).
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intelligence identifying actual terrorists, investigating agents initially
arrested everyone they encountered who was not in compliance with
immigration regulations - regardless of whether there was any
reason to suspect them of terrorist ties. "[N]o distinction generally was
made between the subjects of [an investigative] lead and any other
individuals encountered at the scene 'incidentally' because the FBI
67
wanted to be certain that no terrorist was inadvertently set free."
The Inspector General's report indicates that INS detentions as well
as "material witness" warrants were pretextual tactics used to achieve
DOJ's goal of incapacitating all suspicious individuals until the
government could gather some real intelligence:
[FBI and INS agents] clearly understood from the earliest days after the terrorist
attacks that the Department wanted September 11 detainees held without bond until
the FBI cleared them of any connections to terrorism. This "hold until cleared" policy
was not memorialized in writing, and our review could not determine the exact origins
of the policy. However, this policy was clearly communicated
to INS and FBI officials in
68
the field, who understood and applied the policy.

The FBI directed agents to ensure that all those detained for
immigration violations as well as all those detained as "material
witnesses" were held without bond without consideration of the
individualized circumstances of each case. An electronic message sent
around September 18, 2001, from FBI Headquarters to its field offices
instructed agents to articulate reasons why detained individuals
should be kept in custody. These were to be "used by INS to argue for
continued custody in imminent bail recommendation hearings as well
as by the Criminal Division for possible preparation of material
69
witness warrants."
As "hold until cleared" implies, DOJ would not release an
imprisoned detainee before clearing multiple levels of bureaucracy. In
one case, even after an FBI agent confirmed that a Nepalese man he
arrested for a technical immigration violation had no terrorist ties, the
man remained in solitary confinement for two and a half months
before finally being deported. 70 Frustrated by the clearance process,
67. Inspector General's Review, supra note 26, at 16; see also id. at 39 (stating that Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher recalled Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff
telling her that "we have to hold these people until we find out what is going on" (internal
quotations omitted)).
68. Id. at 37; see also id. at 38-40 (explaining officials' perception that policy originated at
highest levels of Justice Department, was unprecedented and risky, would likely be challenged
legally, and would require explanation). "[I]t was understood that the INS was holding
September 11 detainees because the Deputy Attorney General's Office and the Criminal Division
wanted them held." Id. at 38.
69. Id. at 44 (quoting the FBI's electronic communication to its field offices).
70. Nina Bernstein, In F.B.I., Innocent Detainee Found Unlikely Ally, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
2004, at Al.
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the FBI agent took the extremely unusual step of contacting Legal Aid
on behalf of the man he had arrested.7 1 "I felt some-not
responsibility, but I felt that there was no one else," the agent told The
New York Times.72 If a detainee was somehow able to obtain release
before being "cleared", federal agents could use "material witness"
73
warrants in tandem with immigration detention to prolong custody.
Zakaria Soubra's detention was one such case. Two months
before September 11, 2001, FBI Special Agent Kenneth Williams sent
an email to his superiors warning that Middle Eastern aviation
students posed a potential terrorist threat. On May 22, 2002, Agent
Williams testified before Congress about his by-then famous Phoenix
Memo. The following day federal agents arrested Mr. Soubra, a
politically active Lebanese man named in the Phoenix Memo.
Although Mr. Soubra had been a flight safety student at Embry Riddle
Aeronautical University in Prescott, Arizona, there was no evidence
that he had committed any crime. The sole legal basis for his arrest
and detention without bond was a technical violation of the terms of
74
his student visa: he had registered for too few credits.
While he resisted deportation to Lebanon in secret immigration
proceedings,7 5 agents who thought he had provided support to
terrorists repeatedly questioned Mr. Soubra. Around early January
2003, Mr. Soubra either agreed to voluntary deportation or was
ordered deported to Lebanon by an immigration court. The
government, however, was not yet convinced of his innocence and, in
keeping with the unofficial "hold until cleared" policy, did not want
him released from custody. To prevent Mr. Soubra's departure, agents
sought and obtained a "material witness" warrant for his arrest,
claiming that Mr. Soubra's detention was necessary to ensure that he

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 38-39 (2003) (discussing the case of Mr. Tony Ovlia,
who was held for 422 days despite having no connection to terrorism).
74. Dennis Wagner, Deportee Assails 9/11 'Paranoia;Says FBI in Arizona Targeted Him
Unfairly, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 15, 2003, at Al.
75. Secret immigration proceedings were another widely-employed legal maneuver in the
post-September lth
investigation. For background and an interesting First Amendment
analysis of these proceedings, see Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and
Beyond: Consideringthe Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
95, 95-100, 119-25, 157-67 (2004). Professor Kitrosser's analysis of the First Amendment
implications of secret government proceedings is, of course, also relevant to the secret detentions
of the "material witnesses." In fact, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press filed an
amicus brief and sought leave to intervene in the Supreme Court to argue that the public had a
right to know about Mohammed Bellahouel's case. Brief Amici Curiae of The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, M.K.B. v. Warden, 540 U.S. 1213 (2004) (No. 03-6747);
M.K.B. v. Warden, 540 U.S. 1213, 1213 (2004) (denying motion for leave to intervene).
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would testify before a Virginia grand jury investigating the September
11th attacks. While Mr. Soubra thought he was being driven to the
airport for his return to Lebanon, he was instead being driven to a
76
federal prison.
For months, Mr. Soubra was confined as a "material witness"
in the Administrative Maximum Security Penitentiary in Florence,
Colorado, 77 the highest-security federal prison in the United States. 7
The most dangerous convicted federal criminals, among them
Theodore "the Unabomber" Kaczynski, comprise its population. 79 In
May 2003, a year after first being detained, Mr. Soubra testified
before the grand jury in Virginia. For two days, he was interrogated
about what he knew about several other Middle Easterners.
Afterward, he was released and deported to Lebanon.8 0
Because the government used the material witness statute to
arrest individuals against whom it had little or no real evidence of
wrongdoing, it is no surprise that the vast majority of the "material
witness" detainees turned out to have no knowledge of terrorist
activity whatsoever. Like Mr. Mayfield, Mr. Bellahouel, and Mr.
Soubra, the scant information uncovered and published suggests that
the government released nearly all of them after extended
incarcerations when it was satisfied of their innocence.8 1
76. Greg Krikorian, Detainee FacingDeportation Summoned to Probe, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2003, at A21.
77. Id.
78. Greg B. Smith, An Alcatraz for al Qaeda Terrorists,N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 14, 2002, at
8. According to the Department of Justice, ADX-Florence "is the first federal penitentiary in the
nation to be designed specifically for dangerous offenders and to meet the special circumstances
of prisoners whose activity must be severely confined." Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, AG
Reno to Open New Maximum Federal Prison in Florence, Colorado (Jan. 6, 1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/Pre-96/January95/12.txt.html.
79. See Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator (allowing the website visitor to learn an
inmate's location by typing in the inmate's first and last name), at http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/
LocateInmate.jsp (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
80. Wagner, supra note 74, at Al.
81. The cases discussed in this Article are not the only ones that have been reported. Some
facts about a few other cases have been published as well. For example, Egyptian-born Abdallah
Higazy was arrested as a "material witness" when a hotel security guard lied to the FBI about
having discovered a radio transceiver in Mr. Higazy's room, which overlooked the World Trade
Center. The FBI later claimed that Mr. Higazy had confessed. Mr. Higazy was cleared when
another hotel guest claimed the radio, prompting questions about how the false confession was
obtained. In the interim, Mr. Higazy spent thirty-one days in solitary confinement and was
charged with lying to federal agents. Mark Hamblett, FBI Examiner Sued Over False 9/11
Confession, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 2002, at 1. More recently, the FBI arrested Ismail Selim Elbarasse
as a material witness after his wife was seen videotaping the Bay Bridge in Baltimore,
Maryland. Mr. Elbarasse was released on a one million dollar bond following a sealed detention
hearing. Stephanie Hanes, Material Witness in Hamas Case is Released; Va. Man Was Held 10
Days After Wife Taped Bay Bridge; 3 Houses Secure $1 Million Bond, BALT. SUN, Aug. 31, 2004,
at 1A.
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III. CRITICISM OF THE SECRET "MATERIAL WITNESS" DETENTIONS
Despite the government's unprecedented use of "material
witness" warrants to effectuate widespread secret detentions since
September 11th, neither legal scholars nor courts have seriously
questioned the constitutionality of imprisoning "material witnesses".
This practice gained acceptance because, before incorporation of the
Fourth Amendment against the states,8 2 the state and federal
governments primarily used material witness detentions to keep
witnesses from crossing state lines and not testifying. Scholarship
before September 11th focused on whether the practice of detaining
witnesses could be squared with evolving notions of due process rather
than on the Fourth Amendment's requirement that probable cause
underlie every arrest and detention.8 3 In line with this thinking, a
federal court in Nebraska held in 1977 that the arrests of a murder
suspect's two brothers pursuant to the state's material witness
statutes violated due process because they were made "without
adequate advance notice and without a written statement of reasons
in support of the result."8 4 Such procedural due process concerns,
however, implicitly concede that a witness can constitutionally be held
without bond if the right procedures are followed.8 5 The question that
the DOJ's indiscriminate post-September 11th dragnet raises is how
the prolonged detention of innocent individuals can be squared with
the Fourth Amendment's categorical ban on unreasonable seizures.

82. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) ('The security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police - which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic to a
free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause."), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
83. See, e.g., Ronald L. Carlson, Jailingthe Innocent: The Plight of the Material Witness, 55
IOWA L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1969) (stating vaguely that evolving notions of equal protection will
require reexamination of material witness statutes should they "pass new constitutional tests
likely to be posed"); Ronald L. Carlson & Mark S. Voelpel, Material Witness and Material
Injustice, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 12-15 app. 8 (1980) (noting that constitutional challenges to state
material witness statutes have generally failed and proposing model statute); Daniel W. Henry,
Comment, The Wetback as Material Witness: PretrialDetention or Deposition?, 7 CAL. W. L. REV.
174, 182 (1970) (noting but not analyzing possible constitutional objections to witness detention);
Roger A. Lowenstein, Comment, Detention of Material Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 2 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 115, 127-28 (1966) (positing that detention could be reasonable "only in the
most extreme cases" and listing factors to satisfy due process).
84. In re Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1216 (D. Neb. 1977).
85. Indeed, despite ordering the immediate release of the witnesses challenging their
detention, the judge in the Nebraska case stated that the statutes were not facially
unconstitutional because they "merely provide the authority to require material witnesses to
make recognizance." Id. The judge presumed that in the future the statutes "would be construed
in such a way as to avoid the constitutional questions." Id.
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Curiously, however, since September 11th, criticism of the
Department's incarceration of "material witnesses" in legal
scholarship as well as the mainstream press has focused on the
material witness statute's proper purpose and scope rather than on its
constitutionality.8 6 The principal complaint accuses DOJ of "abusing"
the material witness statute because it is intended to ensure
witnesses' availability at legal proceedings rather than to provide a
87
means of capturing and investigating suspicious characters.
Naturally, the question of whether a grand jury investigation is a
"criminal proceeding" under the statute receives much attention.8 8 In
the end, all such criticism boils down to a policy argument against
"material witness" detentions rather than a legal argument. The
complaints, in other words, implicitly concede that the government is
acting rashly but constitutionally-which turns out not to be the
foregone conclusion it is widely assumed to be.
Professor David Cole's book examining the disparate treatment
of noncitizens and citizens in the September 11th investigation, for
example, implies that the material witness statute has some
constitutional applications: "Since September 11 ... the Justice
Department has aggressively exploited the material witness law, not
86. See, e.g., Robert Boyle, The Material Witness Statute Post September 11: Why It Should
Not Include Grand Jury Witnesses, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 13, 16-34 (2003) (arguing that
material witness statute should not reach grand jury witnesses to avoid potential constitutional
problems); Roberto Iraola, Terrorism, Grand Juries, and the Federal Material Witness Statute, 34
ST. MARY'S L.J. 401, 424-28 (2003) (arguing that material witness statute applies to grand jury
witnesses); Laurie E. Levenson, Detention, Material Witnesses and the War on Terrorism, 35
LOy. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1222-25 (2002) (arguing that DOJ is using material witness statute for
investigatory purposes); Stacey M. Studnicki & John P. Apol, Witness Detention and
Intimidation: The History and Future of Material Witness Law, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 483, 51131 (2002) (arguing that material witnesses can be arrested for grand jury proceedings but that
investigatory arrests are an abuse); MICHAEL GREENBERGER, INDEFINITE MATERIAL WITNESS
DETENTION WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE: THINKING OUTSIDE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 40-41
(Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 2004-01, 2004), at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/ssrn-ID494763_code342745.pdf (Jan. 29, 2004) (arguing that material
witness statute should be revised by Congress); see also Angie Cannon, Taking Liberties: Are
Tough New Responses to Terrorism Upsetting the Balance Between Legal Rights and National
Security?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 12, 2003, at 44, 46 (describing the intended purpose of
the material witness statute for detaining those who would flee the country to avoid testifying);
Adam Liptak, For Post-9/11 Material Witness, It Is a Terror of a Different Kind, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2004, at Al (explaining that those held as material witnesses are eventually charged
with crimes themselves); Tomas Alex Tizon et al., Critics Galvanized by Oregon Lawyer's Case:
His Arrest and Release in the Madrid Bombings Show That the U.S. Ignores Civil Liberties in
Pursuit of Terrorists, Some Legal Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A13 (commenting
that detention of material witnesses gives the government time to develop its case).
87. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 86 (quoting law professors and a former U.S. Attorney as
stating such arrests are legal but that the government is misusing them).
88. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 86, at 17-20; Greenberger, supra note 86, at 41; Iraola, supra
note 86, at 413-28; Studnicki & Apol, supranote 86, at 511-19.
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for its legitimate purpose of ensuring that reluctant witnesses are
available for trial, but for preventive detention of persons who could
not otherwise be held."8 9 Professor Cole does note, however, that
Section 3144 can "serve as an end run around the Fourth Amendment
rule barring arrest and detention without probable cause of criminal
activity... ."90 Professor Michael Greenberger likewise accepts that
detaining "material witnesses" is legal in some circumstances:
"Section 3144 has been widely recognized as applicable to the
detention of witnesses pending a criminal trial, a practice that
generally has been constitutionally sanctioned." 9 1 He proposes revising
the "highly confusing and ambiguous" statute to limit the length of
time that a witness can be incarcerated. 92 This proposal is along the
lines of what the editorial board of The Washington Post advocated
when it urged Congress to "clarify the new circumstances under which
the material-witness law should apply" after Brandon Mayfield's
release. 9 3 Similarly, Professor Laurie Levinson posits: "In the name of
security, we have pushed the legal envelope by using laws that were
' 94
created for other purposes to assist in detaining perceived enemies.
Her essay cautions that these detentions represent a "dangerous
trend" but accepts that detaining witnesses is legal as long as it is not
95
a pretext for detaining suspects.
The idea that the government is "abusing" its authority under
Section 3144 accepts as a premise that the government can in some
circumstances incarcerate innocent witnesses. The argument is
therefore merely a complaint that the government is acting heavyhandedly but not illegally. It concedes that the government
legitimately has the power to arrest witnesses but should exercise that
power with better judgment, purer motives, and greater restraint.
If the major objection to the post-September 11th "material
witness" detentions is that the targets are not true material witnesses,
then the problem must be that the Judiciary is not fulfilling its
obligation to ensure the law is followed. As DOJ has repeatedly
89. Cole, supra note 73, at 37.
90. Id.
91. Greenberger, supra note 86, at 10.
92. Id. at 40-41; see also Studnicki & Apol, supra note 86, at 529-31 (proposing alternative
model material witness statute to prevent its misuse for investigatory purposes).
93. Arresting Witnesses, supra note 23; see also Apology, supra note 23 (lamenting that
"sustained legislative interest has been sadly lacking").
94. Levenson, supra note 86, at 1225.
95. Id. at 1222-23, 1226; see also Studnicki & Apol, supra note 86, at 521-23 (arguing that
investigatory detentions' are not the intended purpose of the material witness laws" and would
be unreasonable under Fourth Amendment though material witness arrests for proper purposes
are constitutional).
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pointed out, a federal judge or magistrate judge has, by signing each
warrant, represented that the statutory criteria are met in every case.
While the circumstances of many of the "material witness" detentions
undermine the image of careful and skeptical judicial oversight that
the Department hopes to convey, the lack of such oversight can only be
blamed on the Judiciary. If Section 3144 authorizes a practice that is
in fact constitutional, the Judiciary has the responsibility to ensure
that the requisites of the statute are satisfied in every particular. That
is, after all, why judges rather than prosecutors authorize warrants. 96
If, on the other hand, the argument is that the government is
not respecting the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, then there is no
legal problem because the Fourth Amendment is not concerned with
the government's motives for arresting any witness. The subjective
reason for the seizure-i.e. whether the arresting agent or prosecutor
believes that the target is a potential criminal or a witness necessary
at some proceeding-is of no constitutional significance. The Supreme
Court has unanimously rejected the notion that the constitutionality
of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment depends on the government
91 Such
agent's subjective motivation for making it.
determinations are
not only extremely difficult to make-imagine a defense attorney
cross-examining a prosecutor about the government's true reasons for
seeking a given "material witness" warrant-but are ultimately
irrelevant. If Section 3144 in fact authorizes a constitutional
procedure and a person is a "material witness" under that statute's
criteria, why should the arresting agent's or the prosecutor's
motivation affect the legality of the seizure? As the Court put it, "the
Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain
actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective
intent."98 The Constitution either permits the incarceration of
innocent witnesses or it does not. The government's subjective reasons
96.

As Justice Jackson famously noted in the context of searches rather than seizures:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested
determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search
without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's
homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (footnote omitted).
97. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) ("[S]ubjective intentions play no role
in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." (quoting Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 813 (1996))); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1996) (same).
98.

Whren, 517 U.S. at 814.
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for wanting to detain the witnesses legally do not and should not
99
matter.
To be sure, there is no doubt that DOJ has detained people as
"material witnesses" to investigate and interrogate them as possible
terrorists. The Department of Justice has made no secret of it. Indeed,
Michael Chertoff, then head of the DOJ's Criminal Division and now
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, told The
Washington Post that a material witness warrant is "an important
investigative tool in the war on terrorism." 10 0 Mr. Chertoff added,
"Bear in mind that you get not only testimony-you get fingerprints,
you get hair samples-so there's all kinds of evidence you can get from
a witness." 10 1 Federal agents candidly told reporters that Brandon
Mayfield was arrested as a "material witness" to prevent him from
fleeing while authorities built a case against him. 10 2 Prosecutors
opposed Mr. Mayfield's release by arguing that they were
investigating him as a criminal suspect. 10 3 The affidavit filed to obtain
Mohammed Bellahouel's arrest suggests the same motive for his
detention; it stated that the FBI had not been able to "rule out the
possibility that the respondent is somehow linked to, or possesses
10 4
knowledge of, the terrorist attacks."
Moreover, the tactic is occasionally effective in uncovering a
criminal. In a very small number of cases, the government has
ultimately brought charges against an individual originally detained
as a "material witness." On March 20, 2003, FBI agents executed a
material witness arrest warrant on thirty-nine year-old computer
programmer Maher Hawash as he arrived for work. A little while
later, armed agents awoke Mr. Hawash's children and wife, Oregon
native Lisa Ryan, and searched their home in Hillsboro, Oregon.10 5
Mr. Hawash had been a United States citizen since 1990 and had
worked for Intel Corporation from 1992 until he was laid off in 2001.

99. Id.
100. Fainaru & Williams, supra note 47.
101. Id.
102. See Kershaw & Johnston, supra note 4 (noting that law enforcement officials planned to
monitor Mr. Mayfield covertly until news leaked to the media).
103. Government's Response and Opposition to Emergency Motion for Release of Material
Witness, In re: Federal Grand Jury 03-01 (D. Or.) (No. 04-MC-9071) (on file with author).
104. Dan Christensen, Low Burden of Proof"Coincidence, UncorroboratedReport Enough To
Get Arab Waiter in South Florida Detained Five Months, DAILY BUS. REV. (Miami), Mar. 14,
2003, at Al (quoting FBI affidavit).
105. Timothy Egan, Terrorism Task Force Detains an American Without Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2003, at A15; Blaine Harden, Engineer Held as Part of PortlandProbe, WASH.
POST, Apr. 5, 2003, at A2.
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At the time of his arrest, he was again working for Intel as a contract
employee.106
The day after his arrest, Mr. Hawash appeared before United
States District Judge Robert E. Jones, who scheduled a detention
hearing for more than two weeks later. In the meantime, Mr. Hawash
remained incarcerated, and his friends and relatives received no
information about the reasons for his arrest and detention. 10 7 Mr.
Hawash's family and friends created a website to publicize his
imprisonment and to solicit donations for legal fees.1 08 Their effort
garnered considerable media attention and criticism of the secretive
detention. 109
On the day of the detention hearing, Judge Jones explained in
a written order that the hearing would be "closed to the public because
of the potential that the related grand jury proceedings may be
compromised." 110 Judge Jones granted the government's request to
hold Mr. Hawash in custody without bail, "but not indefinitely," and
scheduled a hearing to revisit the matter of detention for April 29,
2003.111 Any documents on which the judge relied as well as the
112
judge's reasons for ordering detention were kept under seal.
Because Mr. Hawash's family and friends learned nothing about the
reasons for his detention, they speculated that his arrest was
113
connected to some donations he had made to an Islamic charity.
For five weeks, Mr. Hawash was held as a "material witness"
at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sheridan, Oregon, pursuant
to Judge Jones's order. The day before the April 29th hearing, the
106. Matthew Yi, FBI Jails ex-Intel Worker, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 2, 2003, at B1.
107. Questionable Detention, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 23, 2003, at B6.
108. Egan, supra note 105, at A15; Harden, supra note 105, at A2.
109. See, e.g., Hal Bernton, Intel Colleagues Incensed Over Man's Imprisonment, SEATTLE
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2003, at B1 (reporting that a former Intel vice-president had "put his business on
hold" to raise money and public awareness for Mr. Hawash); Robyn E. Blumner, Go Directly to
Jail, Crime or Not, in Ashcroft's U.S., ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003, at 8D (describing
Mr. Hawash as fortunate to have colleagues in the computer industry eager to inform the public
of his detention); Timothy Egan, Terrorism Task Force Detains an American Without Charges,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2003, at A15 (quoting the former Intel executive's description of Mr.
Hawash's arrest as "some kind of 'Alice in Wonderland' meets Franz Kafka"); Blaine Harden,
Engineer Held as Part of Portland Probe, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2003, at A2 (announcing the
establishment of the website and a rally on the day of Mr. Hawash's closed hearing); Kristi
Heim, DetainedIntel Engineer Becomes Internet Cause, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 22, 2003,
at 1 (mentions that the site had attracted more than 70,000 visitors and generated more than
15,000 in donations); Swarns, supra note 55 (reporting that some Muslims did not publicly
protest or contribute to the fund because they were "fearful of government retaliation").
110. In re Grand Jury Material Witness Detention, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (D. Or. 2003).
111. Id. at 1269.
112. Id.
113. Swarns, supra note 55.
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government filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Hawash, charging
him with conspiring to provide material support to Al Qaida and the
Taliban and to wage war against the United States. Specifically, the
government alleged that Mr. Hawash was part of a group that
traveled from the Portland, Oregon, area to Hong Kong, intending to
enter Afghanistan and fight with the Taliban against United States
forces. 114 Thus, on April 29th, Mr. Hawash appeared before Judge
1 15
Jones as an accused criminal rather than as a "material witness.'
On May 2, 2003, a superseding indictment was filed against Mr.
11 6
Hawash and six previously charged co-conspirators.
Ultimately, Mr. Hawash cooperated with the government, pled
guilty, and was sentenced to seven years in prison.1 17 Mr. Hawash's
guilty plea, however, did not silence complaints that the government
abused its authority by jailing him for five weeks as a material
witness.1 1 8 Because Mr. Hawash's co-defendants had been indicted
seven months before he was, it appeared the government had
imprisoned Mr. Hawash to facilitate its investigation of him.
Commenting on the case, the director of the Center for National
Security Studies (lead plaintiff in the civil suit against DOJ to obtain
information on material witnesses) told the Philadelphia Inquirer:
"It's an abuse of authority to jail someone whom you have targeted as
a potential criminal suspect under the guise of trying to obtain his
testimony in front of a grand jury."1 19
That sentiment, echoed by legal scholars and pundits alike, is
an understatement. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has observed, the
Fourth Amendment was specifically intended to prevent arrests of
suspicious characters for investigatory purposes:
114. McCartney Affidavit
164, United States v. Maher Mofeid Hawash, (No. 03-481) (D.
Or.) (on file with author).
115. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Maher Mofeid Hawash, (No. 03-481) (D. Or.) (on
file with author).
116. All seven defendants were charged with conspiring to levy war against the United
States in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2384 (2005); conspiring to provide material support and
resources to Al Qaida in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339(b) (2005); and conspiring to contribute
services to Al Qaida and the Taliban in violation of 50 U.S.C.A. § 1705(b) (2005), 31 C.F.R. §§
545.204, 545.206(b), 595.205 and Executive Order Nos. 13099, 13224, 13129, 13268. The
superseding indictment also charged some of Mr. Hawash's co-defendants with certain firearms
offenses. The charges all stemmed from events relating to their alleged effort to join the
Taliban's battle against United States forces. Indictment, United States v. Jeffrey Leon Battle et
al., (No. CR 02-399) (D. Or.) (on file with author).
117. Lynn Marshall & Tomas Alex Tizon, 3 Members of Terrorist Cell Sentenced: One of the
'PortlandSeven'Expresses Sorrow For Trying To Join The Taliban After 9/11, L.A. TIMEs, Feb.
10, 2004, at A12.
118. See, e.g., Questions Unanswered Despite Guilty Plea, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at
B6; Ciotta, supranote 52.
119. Ciotta, supra note 52.
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Hostility to seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of
the Fourth Amendment, and decisions immediately after its adoption affirmed that
"common rumor or report, suspicion, or even 'strong reason to suspect' was not adequate
120
to support a warrant for arrest."

Calling such individuals "detainees" or "material witnesses" does not
mitigate the unconstitutional nature of these incarcerations. As
Justice Scalia recently noted:
To be sure, certain types of permissible noncriminal detention-that is, those not
dependent upon the contention that the citizen had committed a criminal act-did not
require the protections of criminal procedure. However, these fell into a limited number
of well-recognized exceptions-civil commitment of the mentally ill, for example, and
temporary detention in quarantine of the infectious. It is unthinkable that the Executive
could render otherwise criminal grounds for detention noncriminal merely by
disclaiming an intent to prosecute, or by asserting
that it was incapacitating dangerous
121
offenders rather than punishing wrongdoing.

What is "unthinkable" to Justice Scalia has become a routine
investigatory practice of the Department of Justice. Even if the
government occasionally catches a criminal through the artifice of
arresting him or her as a "witness," the Fourth Amendment was
meant to stand as an obstacle to the ends justifying the means. Thus,
the real issue is not whether the government has "abused" the
material witness statute in its terrorism investigation. It is whether it
is ever legal to incarcerate a presumptively innocent witness
regardless of the government's reasons. By what lights can the
government arrest and hold someone as a witness when it lacks
sufficient evidence to charge that person with any crime?

IV. THE BACON HERESY
The incarceration of material witnesses seems to have escaped
close constitutional analysis partly because, prior to September 11th,
it was rarely used (at least federally) and partly because, when it was
used, it was to jail the poor for relatively short periods. 122 For example,
in the early 1970s, a group of Mexican immigrants was smuggled into
the United States illegally and jailed as material witnesses in the

120. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (quoting Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 101 (1959)).
121. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2662 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
122. See COLE, supra note 73, at 36-37; Lowenstein, supra note 83, at 116 ("Although it is
rarely litigated, the detention of material witnesses is not an uncommon practice, especially in
municipal and county courts."). The government occasionally used the statute before September
11th as an investigative tool, notably when it arrested Timothy McVeigh as a "material witness"
to the Oklahoma City bombing investigation. See United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541,
1562 (D. Colo. 1996).
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prosecution of their smugglers. 123 The immigrants later sued the
government for money they claimed they were owed under a federal
statute providing a per diem payment to witnesses. 124 The case
reached the United States Supreme Court, but only on the issue of
what payment was owed. The Court noted: "[T]he petitioners do not
attack the constitutionality of incarcei'ating material witnesses, or the
length of such incarceration in any particular case. ' 125 The Court
therefore did not address the constitutionality of the witnesses'
detention and ultimately awarded them some, but not all, of the
compensation they sought. 126 Apparently, obtaining the witness fee
was more important to the immigrants than challenging their
confinement.
Another factor explaining the few constitutional challenges
may be that practitioners and judges have simply accepted the
constitutionality of a practice that apparently has withstood the test of
time. 127 This was the animating principle underlying Bacon v. United
States,128 the 1971 Ninth Circuit opinion that is primarily responsible
for Section 3144's presumed constitutionality. If Bacon was wrongly
decided, the practice of detaining innocent witnesses under Section
3144 is left without any legal foundation. Not only have federal courts
relied on and followed Bacon in assessing the constitutionality of
"material witness" detentions,' 29 but the legislative history of Section
3144 cites Bacon as the exclusive legal authority for the statute:
[T]he Ninth Circuit found the power to arrest a material witness to be implied in the
grant of authority to release him on conditions under 18 U.S.C. § 3149. In its research
on the law, the court discovered that specific arrest authority existed in federal law from

123. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 579-80 (1973).
124. Id. The statute is 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (2004).
125. Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 588.
126. Id. at 586-87, 590.
127. See Carlson, supra note 83, at 3 ("Lack of awareness by the bench and bar accounts
significantly for the shoddy treatment accorded the material witness under our laws.");
Lowenstein, supra note 83, at 122 (positing that many cases are resolved on statutory grounds,
obviating the need to reach constitutional questions).
128. 449 F.2d 933, 939, 943-45 (9th Cir. 1971).
129. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2003) (Awadallah V)
(approving and following Bacon); In re Grand Jury Material Witness Det., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1266,
1268-69 (D. Or. 2003) (approving and following Bacon); In re Application for Material Witness
Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 290-91, 297-300 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (approving and following
Bacon); United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Awadallah IM)
(adopting arguendo Bacon's probable cause standard) rev'd, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003); United
States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (AwadallahIII) (faulting Bacon
only for not conducting a Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry) rev'd, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir.
2003); Perkins v. Click, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1182-83 (D.N.M. 2001) (following Bacon's probable
cause standard); see also United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541, 1562 (D. Colo. 1996)
(stating same probable cause standard without citing Bacon).
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1790 to 1948. The court concluded that the dropping of the authority in the 1948
revision of federal criminal laws was inadvertent. The committee agrees with that
conclusion and expressly approves the finding of the implied right to arrest in the
authority granted to the judicial officer to release on conditions that is set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3149.130

The Bacon case has had a singularly far-reaching influence on
the acceptance of "material witness" detentions. Astonishingly, Bacon
itself expressly refused to address the appellant's argument that her
arrest and detention violated the Constitution. 31 The strange reason
provided by the court was that she did not "cite us to any provision of
the Constitution which supports her claim, nor does she refer to any
132
case authority."'
The petitioner in Bacon, Leslie Bacon, was arrested in
Washington, D.C., as a "material witness" to a grand jury proceeding
in Seattle. 133 A judge ordered Ms. Bacon imprisoned unless she posted
bail of $100,000, which she was unable to do. 134 Ms. Bacon petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that her detention was
illegal. 135 Following a removal hearing, the district court for the
District of Colombia dismissed her petition. 136 After being flown across
the country in custody, Ms. Bacon refiled her petition at the federal
courthouse in Seattle. 137 She argued that the government had no
power to assure her appearance before the grand jury by detaining her
before she had been served with a subpoena and disobeyed it.138 The
court rejected that argument but granted the petition on the narrow
ground that the government failed to show that procuring Ms. Bacon's
presence by subpoena was impracticable. 139
The Bacon court's holding that the government could arrest
and detain Ms. Bacon even though she had never been subpoenaed is
the product of two errors that have since gone unquestioned. First, the
Bacon court mistakenly concluded that the Founding Fathers
themselves authorized the arrest and detention of "material
witnesses" in the First Judiciary Act of 1789.140 Second, the court
justified this supposedly longstanding practice by redefining "probable

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3211-12.
449 F.2d at 941.
Id.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 934-35.
Id. at 935.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 936.
Id. at 944-45.
Id. at 938.
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cause" and thus rewriting the Fourth Amendment. 141 The Bacon
heresy-that there must be cases in which there is "probable cause" to
incarcerate witnesses because statutory authority to arrest and detain
such witnesses has existed since 1789-has infected every case to
examine the constitutionality of imprisoning material witnesses since.
A. Bacon's Flawed History
When Ms. Bacon was jailed, there was no statute authorizing
the arrest and detention of material witnesses. Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit held that a congressional grant of authority to detain material
witnesses could be inferred from a statute and a rule of criminal
procedure then in effect. 142 The court found in 18 U.S.C. former
Section 3149143 and former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
145
46(b) 144 an implied power to arrest and detain material witnesses.
Each of these provided that, if a person had testimony that was
material to a criminal proceeding and if it appeared that he or she
could not practicably be served by subpoena, the court could require

141. Id. at 941-43.
142. These were former 18 U.S.C. § 3149 and former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
46(b). The rule was withdrawn and replaced by an unrelated provision in 1972 because it was
redundant with Section 3149. Section 3149 was repealed in 1984 and replaced with current 18
U.S.C. § 3144.
143. The statute provided:
If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material in any criminal
proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure his presence
by subpoena, a judicial officer shall impose conditions of release pursuant to section
3146. No material witness shall be detained because of inability to comply with any
condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by
deposition, and further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.
Release may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the
witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
18 U.S.C. § 3149, repealed by Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, c. 1, § 203(a) (1984).
144. The Rule provided:
If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material in any criminal
proceeding and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure his presence
by subpoena, the court or commissioner may require him to give bail for his appearance
as a witness, in an amount fixed by the court or commissioner. If the person fails to
give bail the court or commissioner may commit him to the custody of the marshal
pending final disposition of the proceeding in which the testimony is needed, may order
his release if he has been detained for an unreasonable length of time and may modify
at any time the requirement as to bail.
Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 579 n.1 (1973).
145. Bacon, 449 F.2d at 937. Rule 46(b) was enacted in 1948 and apparently replaced 28
U.S.C. former § 659. Id. at 938. Section 3149 was enacted as part of the Bail Reform Act of 1966.
Id. at 937.
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the person to give bail for his or her appearance. 146 If the person failed
14 7
to give bail, the person could be committed to jail.
Conceding that "neither of the foregoing provisions expressly
grants the power to arrest a material witness," 148 the court observed
that a series of precursor statutes had contained "express reference to
a power to arrest witnesses."149 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit believed that
the power to imprison innocent witnesses dated to the time of the
Founding Fathers. Citing Section 33 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as
well as two successor statutes, 150 the court concluded that the lack of
an express arrest provision after 1948 was a congressional
oversight.1 5 1 "The uninterrupted, existence from 1789 to 1948 of
legislative authority to arrest and detain material witnesses does not
appear to have been broken by the repeal in 1948 of Sections 657 and
659."152 Relying on Bacon's reasoning, Congress sought thirteen years
later to cure the supposed oversight by enacting Section 3144.153
The major problem with the Bacon decision has nothing to do
with whether the Ninth Circuit was right to infer a power to arrest
witnesses where none was expressly granted. The problem is more
serious and fundamental. The Bacon court's belief that the First
Judiciary Act authorized the detention of material witnesses cannot be
reconciled with the firmly established Fourth Amendment doctrine
that every significant detention must be supported by probable cause
to believe that the detainee was involved in the commission of a
crime. 54 If the Bacon court's history is correct, it means that the
Founding Fathers themselves authorized the incarceration of
individuals who were not even suspected of committing a crime. 155 As
146. Id. at 937.
147. Id. at 937 (citing FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 46(b)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 938 & n.5.
150. Act of Aug. 8, 1846, ch. 98, § 7, 9 Stat. 73; 28 U.S.C. § 659 (1925).
151. 449 F.2d at 938.
152. Id.
153. S. REP. NO. 98-225, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3212 n.100.
154. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981) ("[E]very arrest, and every
seizure having the essential attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is supported
by probable cause."); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) ("[Any 'exception' that
could cover a seizure as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule
that Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause."); Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (holding that FBI lacked both constitutional and statutory
authority to make arrest without probable cause).
155. Professor Akil Reed Amar has argued that the Fourth Amendment in fact does not
require that every seizure be supported by probable cause. He argues that some seizures may be
reasonable even where there is not sufficient evidence of criminal activity to satisfy the probable
cause standard. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70-71 (1998). Professor Amar does not
contend, however, that individuals suspected of no crime can be arrested - much less
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history and common sense have it, the Bacon court got history wrong.
Accordingly, the constitutionality of detaining "material witnesses"
under Section 3144 should not be presumed as it has been.
Properly construed, the Judiciary Act of 1789 gives no reason
to believe that the Founding Fathers countenanced the indefinite or
extended incarceration of witnesses. Rather, the Act-as well as each
successive federal material witness statute in effect through 1948recognized that, because witnesses had a duty to testify, courts could
compel them only to promise to appear to give testimony. No bond
could be required of them. Each version of the law expressly limited
the courts' authority to imprison a witness to instances when a
witness willfully refused to promise to appear. The witness could
regain his or her freedom at any time by promising to appear.
The Bacon court believed that the Judiciary Act of 1789
authorized the detention of witnesses because it misunderstood the
Act as treating defendants and witnesses the same. This, however,
was not at all the case. Section 33 of the Act provided:
That for any crime or offence against the United States, the offender may.
agreeably
to the usual mode of process against offenders in such state, . . . be arrested, and
imprisoned or bailed, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States
as by this act has cognizance of the offence. And copies of the process shall be returned
as speedily as may be into the clerk's office of such court, together with the
recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify in the case; which
recognizances the magistrate before whom the examination shall be, may require on
156
pain of imprisonment.

The Act thus distinguished between "offenders" and
"witnesses". Only "offenders" could be "arrested, and imprisoned or
bailed." The Act did not state how a defendant could post bail, but left
that to the manner prescribed by state law. 157 Generally, there were
two possible ways a defendant could do this: by giving a recognizance
or posting a bail bond.158 A "recognizance" was merely an
acknowledgment, given orally and entered into the record of the case,
by which one conceded that he or she had to appear in court for some

incarcerated for weeks or months. Even under Professor Amar's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, the post-September 11th seizures of innocent people under the pretext of "material
witness" arrests would be constitutionally unreasonable. Id.
156. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91.
157. United States v. Zarafonitis, 150 F. 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1907). From the time of the first
Judiciary Act of 1789 through the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1940,
federal courts followed local practice and procedure with respect to matters not specifically
addressed by Congress. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in CriminalCases:
Constitutionaland Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1433, 1435-41 (1984) (discussing origins and development of the supervisory power doctrine).
158. Swan v. United States, 9 P. 931, 935 (Wyo. 1886) (Blair, J., concurring).
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proceeding. 159 If the condition to appear was not later satisfied, the
recognizance had the effect of a judgment against the recognizor
because it was an acknowledgment of an existing duty to testify. 160 A
bail bond, on the other hand, was a contract between the state and a
defendant's sureties to deliver the defendant for trial. 161 Failure to
comply would give rise to a claim of future liability by the government
against the sureties.1 62 In modern usage, the distinction between the
two is usually disregarded but still exists:
Recognizance and bail bond are often used interchangeably, although there is a
distinction between them. A recognizance, properly speaking, is an obligation or record
entered into before a court of record or magistrate duly authorized, conditioned on the
doing of some specified act, while a "bond, or as it is commonly called, a bail bond, is
[also] an obligation but under seal, signed by the party giving the ' same,
with one or
1 63
more sureties, under a penalty, conditioned to do some particular act.

"Witnesses," unlike "offenders," were not subject to arrest,
imprisonment, or bail under the First Judiciary Act. Rather, the
statute authorized only the taking of "recognizances" from them. If a
witness acknowledged his or her duty to appear in that manner, no
other security could be required under the Judiciary Act. It is true
that the Act did provide that a witness's recognizance could be
required "on pain of imprisonment." This, however, did not mean that
a witness could be imprisoned at the court's option. It meant only that
a witness's refusal to recognize his obligation to appear could be
punished. Such a refusal was deemed a contempt of court because the
common law imposed on every individual a duty to testify in court. As
one federal judge made clear at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, there was no authority to incarcerate a witness absent a
willful refusal to testify:
It has been the practice in Pennsylvania to commit to prison such witnesses for the
commonwealth as cannot find security for their appearance at court to testify, in cases
where the justice does not think their personal recognizance sufficient; but I find no
authority for it. By the statutes of 1 & 2 Phil. & M. c. 13, and 2 & 3 Phil. & M. c. 10, the
159. See id. (defining recognizance as "an obligation of record which a man enters into before
some court of record or magistrate duly authorized, binding himself under a penalty to do some
particular act.").
160. State v. Hays, 2 Or. 314, 317-18 (1868); New York v. Kane, 4 Denio 530 (1847)
(Beardsley, J., dissenting).
161. Hays, 2 Or. at 317-18; Kane, 4 Denio 530 (Beardsley, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Western Surety Co. v. United States, 72 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1934) (quoting Swan, 9
P. at 935 (Blair, J., concurring)); see also State v. Bradsher, 127 S.E. 349, 351-52 (N.C. 1925)
(discussing differences between bail bonds and recognizances). The blurring of the distinction
between "recognizance" and "bail" is evidenced in some late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century cases that carelessly use the words interchangeably. See, e.g., United States v.
Zarafonitis, 150 F. 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1907); New Haven v. Rogers, 32 Conn. 221, 224 (1864)
("Nothing is more common than to speak of a recognizance as a bond.").
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justice has power to bind the witnesses by recognizance or obligation to testify, and if
they refuse to be bound, to commit them for contempt. The same power is said to be
virtually included in their commissions; but
it is no where said that they may be
64
compelled to find security, or be committed.1

The practice referred to in Moore may not have been uncommon,
contributing to the false modern notion that such detentions are
constitutional, but no reasoned authority for it existed, as Judge
16 5
Griffith found.
The Judiciary Act's acknowledgment of a court's power to hold
in contempt a witness who refused to promise to appear in court does
not support the idea that a witness who did promise to appear could
be jailed. Not only does the text of the Act not permit that, but such a
provision would have been a sharp deviation from the courts' common
law power. As the Bacon court acknowledged, most state courts "have
held that in the absence of statutory authority there is no common-law
power to detain witnesses before disobedience of a subpoena.' 1 66 What
the Bacon court failed to appreciate was that the same courts that
found no common law authority for the practice also held that there
was no statutory authority for the practice, stressing the importance of
the distinction between taking a recognizance and bailing a
167
defendant.
Two cases cited by Bacon demonstrate that Bacon
misinterpreted the words of the Judiciary Act of 1789.168 In Comfort v.
Kittle, the Iowa Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether
a judge exceeded his authority by requiring a witness to secure his
appearance with a bond when Iowa law authorized the judge to take
only recognizances. 169 The court understood the gravity of the issue,
which the Bacon court failed to grasp: "The power to require persons,
without accusation of wrong, and without a hearing, to give even their
own pledge for their appearance as witnesses, is surely an

164. United States v. Moore, 26 F. Cas. 1308, 1309 n.3 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (opinion of Griffith,
C.J.) (citation omitted). Judge Griffith referred to Pennsylvania's practice because federal courts
followed state rules and practices of criminal procedure. The first Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were not enacted until 1944. Beale, supra note 157, at 1439-40 & n.39.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Durling, 25 F. Cas. 944, 944 (N.D. Ill. 1869) (asserting
without citation of any authority that court can imprison witness for failure to give security for
appearance).
166. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1971). Like a refusal to give
recognizance, disobedience of a subpoena would constitute a contempt of court and would be
punishable as such.
167. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Troy v. Pettit, 44 N.Y.S. 256, 256 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1897); State
v. Calhoun, 13 So. 425, 425-26 (Ala. 1893); State v. Lane, 11 Kan. 458, 459 (1873).
168. 449 F.2d at 939 (citing Comfort v. Kittle, 46 N.W. 988 (Iowa 1890)); Bickley v.
Commonwealth, 25 Ky. 572 (1829).
169. 46 N.W. at 990.
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extraordinary power, and still more extraordinary when security may
be required and imprisonment imposed for a failure to give it."170 The
court concluded that the witness's detention was illegal, resting this
holding on the difference between giving a recognizance and posting a
bail bond, which typically required sureties:
There is a difference between a recognizance and a bond. Webster says: "A recognizance
differs from a bond, being witnessed by the record only, and not by the party's seal." He
defines a "bond" to be, in law, "a writing under seal, by which a person binds himself, his
heirs, executors, and administrators." It is certainly questionable whether authority to
require a recognizance confers power to require a bond .... It is of grave importance to
a witness whether he may be required to give other security than his own promise, and
graver still whether for failure, through inability or otherwise, he may be arrested and
imprisoned. To require sureties and to order imprisonment, in such cases, is the exercise
of an unusual and extraordinary power, and should not be exercised where the authority
is doubtful. 171

Decades earlier, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky had reached
the same result in Bickley v. Commonwealth. 172 John Bickley had been
subpoenaed as a witness against a felony defendant and twice failed to
appear. In due course, he was arrested and brought before the court.
The judge ordered that he post security in the sum of five hundred
dollars to be released. Bickley could not pay the security and the court
refused to accept his personal recognizance. On Bickley's habeas
petition, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the judge exceeded
his authority by requiring security:
[A]uthority is conferred on the magistrates to recognize witnesses to attend at a future
time in court; but nothing is said about requiring security of them. We have not been
able to find any statute, which authorizes the circuit court, to compel witnesses to enter
into recognizances with surety, and on their failure, to commit them to jail. That circuit
courts may require of a witness in a criminal case, a recognizance binding him
personally to appear at a future day of the court, we will not question; but that the
circuit court, can add at pleasure other conditions, which, if not complied with, will
authorize an imprisonment of the witness, can not be conceded. 173

The court further held that, even if security could be required of a
witness, the failure to give it because of poverty or other inability
would not authorize imprisonment because it would not constitute a
contempt of court:
We merely suggest that Bickley's failure to enter into the recognizance with surety,
could not amount to a contempt, for the purpose of fortifying the idea that he was
imprisoned solely upon the ground that he did not give security, and that the circuit
court must have entertained the opinion, that such failure was sufficient to justify his
commitment. Had Bickley failed to enter into a recognizance personally (a thing which

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 989.
Id. at 990.
25 Ky. at 574-76.
Id. at 574.
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he could do, and which he offered to do) that might- have been construed by the
court
17 4
into a contempt of its authority, and imprisonment might have legally resulted.

The reasoning of Bickley and Comfort-cases which the Bacon
court cited-show that Bacon's reading of the First Judiciary Act is
incorrect. In each case, the court respected the distinction between a
recognizance and a bond in interpreting a state statute. The Bacon
court, however, failed to appreciate that crucial distinction in
interpreting the First Judiciary Act. The Bacon court's confusion may
be understandable, as the terms are closely related and the difference
between them has not been respected over the years. Nonetheless,
there is no support for Bacon's conclusion that the Founding Fathers
authorized the detention of witnesses who promised to appear and
testify.
Despite some rewording, the material witness statutes enacted
in 1846 and 1925 likewise lend no support to Bacon's holding. Both
provided that a witness could be detained only upon neglect or refusal
to give a recognizance. The 1846 version differed from the 1789 Act in
that it provided that the judge could require a witness's recognizance
"with or without sureties in his discretion". 175 The 1925 version, which
was later codified at 28 U.S.C. § 659 and remained on the books until
its repeal in 1948, retained this language. 17 6 The insertion of this
174. Id. at 574-75.
175. The 1846 statute provided:
[O1n the application of any attorney of the United States for any district, and upon
satisfactory proof of the materiality of the testimony of any person who shall be a
competent witness, and whose testimony shall, in the opinion of any judge of the
United States, be necessary upon the trial of any criminal cause or proceeding in
which the United States shall be a party or interested, any such judge may compel
such person, so required or deemed by him necessary as a witness, to give
recognizance, with or without sureties in his discretion, to appear on the trial of said
cause or proceeding and give his testimony therein; and for that purpose, the said
judge may issue a warrant against such person, under his hand, with or without seal,
directed to the marshal or other officer authorized to execute criminal or civil process
in behalf of the United States, to arrest such person and carry him before such judge.
And in case the person so arrested shall neglect or refuse to give said recognizance in
the manner required by said judge, the said judge may issue a warrant of commitment
against such person, which shall be delivered to said officer, whose duty it shall be to
convey such person to the prison mentioned in said mittimus. And the said person
shall remain in confinement until he shall be removed to the court for the purpose of
giving his testimony, or until he shall have given the recognizance required by said
judge.
Act of Aug. 8, 1846, ch. 98, § 7, 9 Stat. 73, 73-74.
176. The 1925 version read as follows:
Any judge of the United States, on the application of a district attorney, and on being
satisfied by proof that the testimony of any person is competent and will be necessary
on the trial of any criminal proceeding in which the United States are parties or are
interested, may compel such person to give recognizance, with or without sureties, at
his discretion, to appear to testify therein; and, for that purpose, may issue a warrant
against such person, under his hand, with or without seal, directed to the marshal or
other officer authorized to execute process in behalf of the United States, to arrest and
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phrase might initially appear to support Bacon's historical analysis,
perhaps suggesting that Congress empowered judges to require more
than just a witness's personal recognizance and to jail them if they
could not comply. Worse, the language could suggest that the power to
require a recognizance with sureties existed all along, although it was
not stated expressly in 1789.
However, two cases construing the phrase "with or without
sureties" confirm that it did not authorize judges to require a surety
from a witness who was helpless to comply. A judge's discretion to
require sureties was limited by the proviso that only a witness who
''neglects or refuses to give recognizance" could be committed to jail.
This meant that a judge could require the surety only of a witness who
was able to provide it. Inability to comply would not result in
imprisonment for the same reason given in Bickley-it would not
constitute a contempt of court. Thus case law confirms that the change
in language in the 1846 and 1925 material witness statutes did not
empower judges to imprison a witness who was unable to provide a
surety.
The petitioner in United States v. Lloyd 177 complained that he
was being held in custody as a witness because he could not pay the
five thousand dollar bail set at the request of the federal prosecutor.
Observing that the "oppressive power" to incarcerate witnesses "is not
always exercised with the most prudent precaution," the court held
that the petitioner should be released on his own recognizance, subject
to a one thousand dollar penalty if he failed to appear.178 The court
also noted that the "extraordinary security" of five thousand dollars
bail had been imposed because the government claimed that the
witness had fled the country to avoid service of process 179-a crucial
fact in the case and one distinguishing it from Bacon, in which the
petitioner had made no attempt to evade process. Finding that the
government failed to meet its burden of proving that the witness tried
to evade process or that the witness could afford bail, the court held
that only the witness's recognizance could be required:

bring before him such person. If the person so arrested neglects or refuses to give
recognizance in the manner required, the judge may issue a warrant of commitment
against him, and the officer shall convey him to the prison mentioned therein. And the
said person shall remain in confinement until he is removed to the court for the
purpose of giving his testimony, or until he gives the recognizance required by said
judge.
28 U.S.C. § 659 (repealed 1948).
177. 26 F. Cas. 984 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 15,614).
178. Id. at 985.
179. Id.
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The witness, by his affidavit, now produced, swears ... that he is ready to attend court
and testify in the cause, and has never been absent for the purpose of avoiding doing so;
and that, on the contrary, he immediately returned here, for the purpose of being
present us such witness, on learning from his wife that there was a report here that he
designed keeping away from being a witness on the trial. He further avers, that his
business and family relations are all in this country and that he intends to remain here,
subject to any subpoena in the cause. The government furnishes no testimony directly
contradicting any of these statements, and does not prove that the petitioner is able to
give bail for his appearance,or that there is any fact justifying a presumption that he
will not be amenable to a subpoena, whenever he may be required as a witness, or that
such a personal recognizance in the case as would be ordinarily required of a
householder and resident here, would not be ample security to secure his personal
attendance at court.
Under these circumstances, I shall order the petitioner to be discharged from
imprisonment on his executing his own recognizance in $1,000 penalty, to appear and
testify in court on the trial of the indictments,
when notified to do so on the part of the
18 0
United States, at any time during the term.

Lloyd's reasoning is exactly in accord with that of Bickley,
which did not permit a judge to jail a witness who failed to provide
sureties, not because of neglect or refusal (either of which would
amount to a contempt of court), but rather because of inability to pay.
This interpretation of the statute also squares with Judge Griffith's
observation in 1801 that courts did not have the power to impose
conditions for the release of a witness that the witness could not meet:
It is contrary to the first principles of natural justice, to imprison men who are innocent,
merely because they are too poor and friendless to find bail for their appearances as
witnesses. If the United States may imprison witnesses, so may
the party accused, and a
18 1
whole ship's crew might lay in gaol for six months or a year.

Thus, sureties or other security could be required only of witnesses
who were able to meet such conditions for their release-and the
government had the burden of showing that ability.
Relying on Lloyd, the Supreme Court of Minnesota expressly
held in Minnesota ex rel. Howard v. Grace18 2 that a judge had no
power to detain a witness for inability to meet conditions of release
under that state's almost identical material witness statute. The court
reasoned that, although the state statute (like its federal counterpart)
seemed to grant a judge complete discretion to require sureties of a
witness, it was an abuse of discretion to require sureties of a witness
who was unable to provide them:
In construing the law now before us we do not overlook the fact that, literally taken, its
language is tantamount to leaving it to the discretion of the judge, whether or not to
bind the witness over. This, indeed, is expressly so in the U. S. statute above referred to,
provided it be first satisfactorily proved that the witness is material and necessary; ....

180.
181.
Griffith,
182.

Id. (emphasis added).
United States v. Moore, 26 F. Cas. 1308, 1309 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (No. 15, 805) (opinion of
C.J.).
18 Minn. 398 (1872).
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But though the witness may be required to recognize in the discretion of the court, the
discretion (or judgment) here spoken of must, as in all other like cases, be intended to be
a sound legal discretion. The judgment of the court cannot be capriciously exercised. It
cannot legally abuse its discretion, nor, indeed, is it to be presumed that it will. If for
instance, it would be unjust or oppressive, and against common law and common right,
as it certainly would be, to commit such material witness in default of bail, without any
proof that he had any intention of not appearing and testifying when duly subpoenaed,
but who is too poor to render his recognizance of any value, or too friendless to be able to
give bail, in what sense could it be said, that in the exercise of a sound legal discretion,
the court would be warranted in so doing; or 8what
interest of the state requires the
1 3
incarceration of such a person? Certainly none.

Accordingly, the court held that only a witness who was
willfully in contempt for refusing to give a recognizance that he was
capable of paying could be imprisoned. The court stated, "Refuse or
neglect, as used in this act, mean in our opinion, nothing more than
'refuse,' in the Gen. Statutes both expressions being used in their
ordinary technical sense as equivalent to failure to comply with the
order."'18 4 This interpretation made it unnecessary for the court to
consider the constitutionality of detaining a witness who could not
provide sureties: "Since the commitment was not warranted by the
act, it is, of course, unnecessary to consider whether or not it is
constitutional or warranted by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
constitution of the United States, to commit a witness simply because
' 18 5
he is unable to find security for his attendance."
Lloyd and Grace demonstrate that the Bacon court's belief that
the detention of witnesses was expressly sanctioned by federal law
from 1798 to 1948 has no basis in fact. During that entire 150-year
period, the only statutory authority conferred upon the federal courts
with respect to "material witnesses" was the authority to summon
them to obtain their personal recognizance or promise to appear. After
1846, Congress allowed judges to require sureties of witnesses who
were able to provide them, but that provision has apparently never
been challenged by anyone able to comply. A witness who was unable
to provide sureties to guarantee his or her appearance could still be
required to give only his or her personal recognizance.
Lloyd also clarifies the meaning of Barry v. United States ex
rel. Cunningham,l8 6 a Supreme Court case that Bacon misinterpreted
in support of its flawed historical analysis.1 8 7 In Barry, the Supreme
Court held that the Senate could arrest a witness for the purpose of
bringing him before a committee to testify and hold him in custody "to
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 403-03 (citations omitted).
Id. at 402 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 404.
279 U.S. 597 (1929).
Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 1971).

2005]

MATERIAL WITNESS DETENTIONS

715

compel such attendance."'18 8 Using the material witness statute as an
analogy for the Senate's power to compel the attendance of witnesses,
the Court stated in dicta, that "The constitutionality of this statute
apparently has never been doubted." 18 9 Although the opinion is not
entirely clear on the point, it seems that the Barry court understood
that "recognizance" and "bail" were not interchangeable terms. The
Court correctly noted that the material witness statute then in effect
authorized the detention of a witness only when that witness failed to
give recognizance:
A statute of the United States (U. S. Code, Title 28, § 659 (28 USCA § 659)) provides
that any federal judge, on application of the district attorney, and being satisfied by
proof that any person is a competent and necessary witness in a criminal proceeding in
which the United States is a party or interested, may have such person brought before
him by a warrant of arrest, to give recognizance, and that such person may be confined
until removed for the purpose of giving his testimony, or until he gives the recognizance
required by said judge. The constitutionality of this statute apparently has never been
doubted. Similar statutes exist in many of the states and have been enforced without
question. 190

Some of the Court's analysis, specifically its discussion of statecourt "material witness" cases, 19 1 seems to suggest that witnesses who
could not afford bail could be detained anyway. 192 However, the
opinion ultimately seems to disavow that either federal courts (at
least) or the Senate had any such power:
It fairly may be assumed that the Senate will deal with the witness in accordance with
well-settled rules and discharge him from custody upon proper assurance, by
recognizance or otherwise, that he will appear for interrogation when required. This is
19
all he could properly demand of a court under similar circumstances. 3

Thus the Supreme Court in Barry did not, contrary to the Bacon
court's reading of the case, imply that it was constitutional to imprison
Ms. Bacon because she could not afford to post a $100,000 bond.
B. Bacon's New "ProbableCause"
Mistakenly believing that federal law had authorized the
imprisonment of witnesses since 1789, the Bacon court set upon the
188. 279 U.S. at 616.
189. Id. at 617.
190. Id. at 616-17 (emphasis added).
191. These state court cases are not pertinent to the question of whether Section 3144
authorizes detentions that violate the Fourth Amendment because that amendment was not
incorporated against the states until 1949. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled
on othergrounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
192. Barry, 279 U.S. at 617-18 (citing Minnesota ex rel. Howard v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398
(1872); Ex parte Sheppard, 66 S.W. 304 (1902); Crosby v. Potts, 69 S.E. 582 (1910)).
193. Id. at 619-20 (emphasis added).
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task of reconciling this supposed practice of the Founding Fathers
with the text of the Fourth Amendment. Though it acknowledged that
the Constitution requires that "probable cause" be established for
every arrest, the Bacon court could not apply the usual probable cause
standard because Ms. Bacon had not committed any crime. The
solution was to gut "probable cause" of its age-old substantive
meaning by linguistic sleight of hand and convert it into a mere
standard of proof.194 Former Section 3149 and former Rule 46(b) would
provide the new substantive criteria for determining whether the
Fourth Amendment was satisfied:
Rule 46(b) and § 3149 provide specific criteria for probable cause. Cf. Giordenello v.
United States, 1958, 357 U.S. 480, 485. Before a material witness arrest warrant may
issue, the judicial officer must have probable cause to believe (1) "that the testimony of a
person is material" and (2) "that it may become impracticable to secure his presence by
subpoena." 1 These
requirements are reasonable, and if they are met, an arrest warrant
95
may issue.

Rather than examining whether the statutory provisions
authorizing the detention of "material witnesses" could be reconciled
with the Fourth Amendment, the Bacon court reconciled the
Constitution with this supposedly time-honored practice. Bacon's coup
de grace was the court's audacious proclamation that its newly
conjured "probable cause" standard "is reasonable." Amazingly, this
heretical feat of legerdemain has never been questioned. Nearly every
federal court to consider the arrest of material witnesses before and
after September lth has uncritically adopted Bacon's fundamentally
96
flawed Fourth Amendment analysis.1
"Probable cause" as used in the Fourth Amendment is a
substantive concept of law. It is not a mere standard of proof that can
be satisfied in various ways depending on the particular end to be
achieved. Its meaning embraces not merely a certain quantum of
evidence, but a certain quantum of evidence related to one and only
one specific thing - the commission of a crime. This has always been
so. As Chief Justice Marshall put it:

194. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 941-43 (9th Cir. 1971).
195. Id. at 943 (citation omitted).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Arnsberg v. United
States, 757 F.2d 971, 976-77 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir.
1982); In Re Grand Jury Material Witness Detention, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268-69 (D. Or.
2003); In re Application of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d
287, 290-91, 298-300 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82, 96-97
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42; Perkins v. Click, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1182-83
(D.N.M. 2001); see also United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541, 1562 (D. Colo. 1996)
(applying same probable cause standard without citing Bacon).
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[T]he term 'probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence
which would justify condemnation; and, in all cases of seizure, has a fixed and well
known meaning. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant
suspicion. In 1this,
its legal sense, the Court must understand the term to have been used
97
by Congress.

Indeed, probable cause must have a "fixed and well known
meaning." Otherwise, anything and anyone would be subject to search
and seizure, and the Fourth Amendment would be reduced to a vapid
declaration offering no protection whatsoever. The concept cannot be
redefined with reference to a statute or rule to suit whatever ends the
government wishes to accomplish in any given time or circumstance.
That fixed meaning has always been cause to believe the individual to
be seized is involved in the commission of a crime. This proposition is
so basic and fundamental to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that
citation seems superfluous, but there is no want of authority:
This Court repeatedly has explained that "probable cause" to justify an arrest means
facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown,
19 8
that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.

In short: "The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt." 199
The only case the Bacon court cited to support its new
"probable cause" standard for an arrest, Giordenello v. United
States,200 actually repudiates the idea that "probable cause" can be
redefined from case to case. The petitioner in Giordenello had been
197. Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (emphasis added).
198. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979) (referencing multiple cases); accord
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354-55 (2001) (holding that arrest satisfied the
Fourth Amendment because "[tihere is no dispute that Officer Turek had probable cause to
believe that Atwater had committed a crime in his presence"); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
111 (1975) ("The standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances 'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed
or was committing an offense."' (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964))); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 75 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Probable cause to arrest means evidence
that would warrant a prudent and reasonable man (such as a magistrate, actual or hypothetical)
in believing that a particular person has committed or is committing a crime." (referencing
multiple cases)); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) ("Probable cause exists if the
facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense
has been committed. It is important, we think, that this requirement be strictly enforced, for the
standard set by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen." (citations omitted));
Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878) ("If the facts and circumstances before the officer are
such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offence has been
committed, it is sufficient."); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(g) (requiring magistrate judge to
determine at preliminary examination whether there "is probable cause to believe an offense has
been committed and the defendant committed it").
199. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
200. 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
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convicted of a drug offense. On appeal, he argued inter alia that the
complaint underlying his arrest warrant lacked sufficient information
to enable a judicial officer to determine whether there was probable
cause for his arrest. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the
conviction. The Court held that a perfunctory, conclusory complaint
did not comport with the Rules of Criminal Procedure because it
offered the judicial officer no basis for making the probable cause
determination that the Fourth Amendment requires. 20 1 In the
paragraph Bacon relied upon, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court,
noted that the Rules "must be read in light of the constitutional
requirements they implement," meaning that they must be
interpreted consistently with the rights that the Fourth Amendment
20 2
safeguards.
The Bacon court inverted Justice Harlan's reasoning and
interpreted his opinion to mean that the definition of "probable cause"
changes with the circumstances of a given case. 20 3 In dealing with a
material witness arrest, the Bacon court concluded, the Fourth
Amendment is satisfied whenever the statutory conditions are met
because "Rule 46(b) and § 3149 provide specific criteria for probable
cause." 20 4 This holding is dangerously destructive of the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee against arbitrary arrests. Its twisted logic
would allow Congress to alter the definition of "probable cause" by
statute, effectively eliminating any limitations on the arrest power of
the federal government. If the meaning of "probable cause" is not
"fixed and well known," then anyone can be seized, as Brandon
Mayfield's incarceration starkly demonstrates.
Rather than interpreting the Constitution to permit the
detention of witnesses, the Bacon court should have tested the validity

201. Id. at 486-87.
202. Id. at 485. In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the Court affirmed that the
probable cause requirement of Giordenello emanated not from any rule of procedure but from the
Fourth Amendment itself. Its holding was therefore applicable to arrests made by state officials:
In Giordenello,although this Court construed the requirement of "probable cause" contained
in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it did so "in light of the constitutional"
requirement of probable cause which that rule implements.... The principles announced in
Giordenello derived, therefore, from the Fourth Amendment, and not from our supervisory
power. Accordingly,... they may properly guide our determination of "probable cause"
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 112 n.3 (citations omitted); see also Overton v. Ohio, 534 U.S. 982, 984 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (discussing Aguilar and Giordenello).
203. Given Giordenello's holding that a warrant petition must provide sufficient information
for a judicial officer to make an independent probable cause determination, Bacon's reliance on
the case in creating a new "probable cause" standard allowing for the incarceration of completely
innocent individuals is especially ironic.
204. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971).
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of former Section 3149 and former Rule 46(b) against the "fixed and
well known meaning" meaning of the words in the Constitution. Had
the Bacon court applied the one and only definition of "probable
cause," the practice of detaining witnesses could not have survived
constitutional analysis. Of course, the seizure of one innocent of any
wrongdoing can never be supported by "probable cause" because
"probable cause" for an arrest exists only where there is reason to
believe that the prospective arrestee committed a crime.
V. "MATERIAL WITNESS" CASES AFTER SEPTEMBER 1 1TH

The Bacon heresy endures to this day, providing authority to
detain innocent individuals without real probable cause-i.e. reason to
think they are involved in a crime. Not only did Congress, as
evidenced by the legislative history of Section 3144, unquestioningly
follow Bacon, but so have the federal courts. Before September 11th,
courts and litigants accepted Bacon's version of history and contrived
"probable cause" formulation without question. 20 5 After September
11th, Bacon's flawed reasoning has provided justification for the secret
arrest and incarceration of an unknown number of individuals based
on little or no evidence of any wrongdoing (much less involvement in
terrorism). Despite the fact that such arrests are exactly the sort that
the Fourth Amendment was meant to forbid, Bacon's bizarre approval
of the tactic has gone unquestioned. This makes it possible for the
government to continue to arrest and hold innocent individuals-like

205. See, e.g., In re De Jesus Berrios, 706 F.2d 355, 357-58 (1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting
witness's challenge to arrest on grounds that material witnesses cannot be arrested to give hair
samples or appear in lineups and that warrant was not supported by sufficient quantum of
evidence; no constitutional challenge raised); United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 230-31 (7th
Cir. 1982) (noting that the witness did not challenge the power of the court to arrest material
witnesses but challenged Bacon only with respect to the quantum of evidence required to support
a warrant); United States ex rel. Gibbs v. Zelker, 496 F.2d 991, 992-93 (2d Cir. 1974) (dismissing
habeas petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies of state prisoner challenging
constitutionality of arrest pursuant to state material witness arrest statute without reaching
constitutional issues); United States v. Coldwell, 496 F. Supp. 305, 307 (E.D. Okla. 1979)
(ordering issuance of material witness arrest warrant in proceeding to which target of warrant
was not a party; no constitutional challenge raised); United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627,
628-29 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (denying witness's motion to quash arrest warrant based on grounds
that witness was not material and that warrant was not supported by sufficient showing; no
constitutional challenge raised); cf. Application of Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1215-16 (D. Neb.
1977) (sustaining due process challenge to confinement pursuant to Nebraska's material witness
statute; adopting Bacon "probable cause" standard arguendo and holding it was not met). Bacon
had gone unchallenged in state courts as well. See, e.g., State v. Brady, 388 N.W.2d 151, (1986)
(citing Bacon's probable cause analysis in assessing the validity of a material witness arrest
warrant).
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Brandon Mayfield and Mohammed Bellahouel-at the discretion of
federal law enforcement officers.
There have been published decisions in only two cases
involving a challenge to a "material witness" detention in connection
with the September 11th investigation. Both have focused on the
statute's scope and applicability to grand jury investigations rather
than on its constitutionality. The one judge to hold the arrest of a
"material witness" illegal did so on statutory grounds, while implying
that such arrests would be constitutional in other circumstances not
before the court. 20 6 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that
judgment and accepted Bacon's flawed statutory and constitutional
20 7
analysis without any real explanation or analysis.
A. The Awadallah Litigation
Ten days after September 11, 2001, federal agents in San Diego
arrested Osama Awadallah, a twenty-one-year-old Jordanian legal
resident of the United States. Three hours later, the government
sought a material witness warrant from a judge in New York City. An
FBI agent's affidavit filed in support of the warrant request stated
that a piece of paper with Mr. Awadallah's name and telephone
number was found in a car that hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi abandoned at
Dulles International Airport. The agent also stated that Mr.
Awadallah's substantial family ties in Jordan made Mr. Awadallah a
208
flight risk.
The affidavit failed to inform the judge of several relevant
facts, not the least of which was that Mr. Awadallah had been
arrested and booked into federal prison in San Diego hours before the
warrant petition was filed. 20 9 The FBI agent also did not mention that
the phone number found in the car used by the hijackers was assigned
to an apartment where Mr. Awadallah had not lived for eighteen
months-a fact that undermined any connection between Mr.
Awadallah and the terrorist plot. The affidavit failed to state that

206. See United States v. Awadallah (Awadallah III), 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 73-76 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) ("Given its poor reasoning, Bacon's conclusion that Rule 46 allows courts to detain
witnesses for grand jury investigations deserves no respect. Indeed, its conclusion is particularly
troubling because the court never mentioned section 3149, the statute under which Bacon was
arrested."), rev'd by United States v. Awadallah (Awadallah V), 349 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2003).
207. Awadallah V, 349 F.3d 42, 52-64 (2d Cir. 2003).
208. United States v. Awadallah (Awadallah IV), 202 F. Supp. 2d 82, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
rev'd by Awadallah V, 349 F.3d 42. Although the government professed disagreement with the
facts as found by the district court, it did not challenge those facts on appeal. Awadallah V, 349
F.3d at 45.
209. Awadallah V, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 94-95; Awadallah V, 349 F.3d at 47.
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three of Mr. Awadallah's brothers, one of whom had been a United
States citizen for fifteen years, lived in San Diego, giving Mr.
Awadallah substantial family connections to the United States and
arguably making him less of a flight risk. 2 10 Also not mentioned was
the fact that Mr. Awadallah had been questioned for six hours the day
before and had been by all accounts extremely cooperative. 211 He had
consented to a search of his apartment and cars, though he later tried
in vain to revoke his consent to search one of his cars. 212 After
interrogating him, FBI agents drove Mr. Awadallah back to his house
at 11:00 p.m. and told him to return the next morning for a follow-up
polygraph examination. Even though he was not kept under
surveillance, Mr. Awadallah returned to the FBI's office, only to be
arrested before the government applied for the warrant. 2 13
On the basis of the misleading affidavit, Chief Judge Michael
Mukasey of the Southern District of New York signed a "material
witness" warrant. 2 14 On that authority, Mr. Awadallah remained
imprisoned in solitary confinement at San Diego Metropolitan
Correctional Center as a high-security inmate. Because of this
classification, whenever he left his cell, which occurred several times a
day, he was strip-searched. After six days there, he was moved
through a series of federal prisons until he arrived at New York
Metropolitan Correctional Center on October 1, 2001. There he
remained designated a high-security prisoner and was kept in solitary
confinement. He could not use the telephone or have visitors. While
incarcerated, Mr. Awadallah acquired multiple unexplained bruises. 215
On October 10, 2001, Mr. Awadallah testified without
immunity before a New York grand jury investigating the September
11th attacks. Mr. Awadallah answered hundreds of questions, telling
the grand jury exactly what he had told the FBI the day before his
arrest when he was, according to the agents, "'very, very
cooperative."' 216 He admitted to knowing two of the September 11th
hijackers and to having last seen them a year earlier. After Mr.
Awadallah testified before the grand jury, the government charged
him with perjury and continued holding him in custody. Specifically,
the government charged Mr. Awadallah with falsely denying that he
210. Awadallah IV, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 97.
211. Id. at 92-93, 97-98.
212. Id. at 90-91. The search of the car had been completed by the time the agents searching
it received word of the revocation of consent. Id.
213. Id. at 93.
214. Awadallah V, 349 F.3d at 47.
215. Awadallah III, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
216. Awadallah TV, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 92 (quoting agent's testimony).
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knew that one of the hijackers he had met was named "Khalid". 217 He
was not released on bail until December 13, 2001, after spending
eighty-three days in prison. 218 The government has never alleged that
Mr. Awadallah had any knowledge of or connection to the September
11th attacks or any other terrorist plot.
Mr. Awadallah moved to dismiss the indictment and to
suppress all evidence against him on several grounds. 219 Following a
four-day evidentiary hearing detailing the events surrounding the
arrest and detention, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District
of New York issued two orders. In the first order, Awadallah III, the
judge held that the material witness statute could not be used to
arrest individuals to appear before a grand jury. She held that a grand
jury investigation was not a "criminal proceeding" within the meaning
of that phrase in the statute. 220 Mr. Awadallah, however, had not
made this argument. To avoid having to decide the statute's
constitutionality, the district court reached the issue sua sponte and,
221
according to the government, without briefing or argument.
While criticizing the Bacon court for having "brushed aside"
the constitutional issue, 222 Awadallah III accepted Bacon's improvised
"probable cause" formulation without analysis. Incredibly, the opinion
states that Congress can override the Bill of Rights: "In enacting [the
material witness statute], Congress carved out a carefully limited
exception to the general rule that an individual's liberty may not be
encroached upon unless there is probable cause to believe that he or
she has committed a crime." 223 The court focused exclusively on
whether it was reasonable to apply the statute in a grand jury
proceeding. 224 The opinion explains that "a serious constitutional
question under the Fourth Amendment" would be raised only if the
statute applied to grand jury proceedings. If so, the government's
interest in investigating a possible crime would likely not outweigh
the witness's liberty interest. The seizure would therefore not be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. That issue, however, would
for some unexplained reason not arise in the case of a witness
217. When initially questioned by the FBI, Mr. Awadallah admitted knowing hijacker AlHazmi and another man (presumably Khalid A1-Mihdhar) but denied knowing the other man's
name. Id. at 108-09. He testified consistently before the grand jury. Awadallah III, 202 F. Supp.
2d at 58-59.
218. Awadallah III, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 58-59.
219. Id. at 59.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 76.
Awadallah V, 349 F.3d 42, 49 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2003).
Awadallah III, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 76-79.
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detained to testify at trial, presumably because this would somehow
225
tip the reasonableness balance in the government's favor.
in the simultaneously-issued Awadallah TV,Judge Scheindlin
further confused the analysis by treating "probable cause" as a mere
standard of proof rather than as a substantive legal notion, just as the
Bacon court had. Awadallah IV held that, even if Section 3144 applied
to grand jury proceedings, the indictment against Mr. Awadallah had
to be dismissed on the alternative ground that the glaring omissions
in the FBI agent's affidavit amounted to a deliberate attempt to
deceive the court. The court additionally held that all the evidence
against Mr. Awadallah had to be suppressed as the fruit of his illegal
226
arrest.
To determine whether the warrant was illegally obtained, the
court adopted the Bacon "probable cause" formulation arguendo,
questioning only whether that quantum of evidence-that
"standard"-was the correct one:
Section 3144 is silent as to what standard a court should use to decide whether "the
testimony of the person is material" and whether "it may become impracticable to secure
the presence of the person by subpoena." One federal court has suggested that the
standard should be "probable cause to believe" that these conditions are met. Probable
cause, of course, is generally used in the context of authorizing the arrest of a suspected
criminal or authorizing a search to obtain evidence of criminal conduct. Whether the
same standard should be used to arrest a material witness is open to debate. In any
event, for the limited purpose of determining whether the arrest warrant was
227
improvidently issued, I shall apply the probable cause standard.

Thus, having accepted the Bacon heresy that the meaning of "probable
cause" can change and that "probable cause" describes merely the
weight of evidence needed, the court held that the warrant was invalid
because it was procured by deceit: 228 "[H]ad there been full disclosure,
a neutral judicial officer would not have found probable cause to
believe that 'it may become impracticable to secure Awadallah's
229
presence by subpoena."'
In the second part of the decision, which held that all the
evidence against Mr. Awadallah was tainted by his illegal seizure, the
court abandoned without explanation Bacon's formulation and used
the correct Fourth Amendment probable cause analysis:
In this case, the government does not contend that the agents had probable cause, or
even reasonable suspicion, to believe that Awadallah had committed a crime. Therefore,

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 77-78.
Awadallah IV, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82, 106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Id. at 96-97 (citing Bacon and 18 U.S.C. § 3144).
Id. at 100.
Id. at 99 (internal brackets and ellipsis omitted).
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the sole question is whether he was seized. If so, the agents violated Awadallah's Fourth
2 30
Amendment rights.

The court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, Mr.
Awadallah could not have felt free to ignore the FBI agents and go
about his business, and that therefore he was illegally seized. 231
The court's confused Awadallah IV opinion seems to suggest
that, while federal agents can arrest an individual with a "material
witness" arrest warrant, evidence obtained from a "material witness"
seized without such a warrant is subject to suppression under the
usual Fourth Amendment analysis. 2 32 Again, the court failed to
appreciate that the meaning of "probable cause" in the Fourth
Amendment cannot shift this way without eviscerating the protection
from arrests based on mere suspicion that it is meant to guarantee.
While the government appealed Judge Scheindlin's decision,
Chief Judge Mukasey, who had issued the warrant for Mr.
Awadallah's arrest, 233 severely criticized Awadallah III in another
case challenging a "material witness" arrest. 234 Pointing out that
Judge Scheindlin's interpretation did not resolve any constitutional
doubts, he held that Section 3144 applies to grand jury proceedings
and that the statute's constitutionality has long been established:
[T]he Awadallah Court appears to have found at least a serious possibility that it is
inherently unreasonable to detain a witness for appearance before a grand jury.
There are at least two major flaws in that reasoning. First, . . . construing the
statute to exclude grand jury proceedings does not avoid the constitutional problem
presented by imprisoning someone who is merely a witness and is not accused of a
crime, if indeed doing so presents a constitutional problem. Second, there is a
substantial body of case law, including but not limited to Supreme Court case law ...
showing that the constitutional problem discerned by the Awadallah court does not
235
exist.

Strikingly, Judge Mukasey's opinion does not so much as mention
"probable cause."
On the government's appeal from the Awadallah decision, the
Second Circuit reversed all of Judge Scheindlin's rulings and approved
Judge Mukasey's decision (even though that case was not before the

230. Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
231. See id. at 107.
232. See id. ("Because the government does not contend that the agents had probable cause
to believe that Awadallah had committed any crimes, the seizure of Awadallah was unlawful.")
(emphasis added).
233. Awadallah V, 349 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2003).
234. In re Application for U.S. Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289-300
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
235. Id. at 298.
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court). 236 On the constitutional question, the Court of Appeals ruled
that "the detention of material witnesses for the purpose of securing
237
grand jury testimony has withstood constitutional challenge."
B. Authorities Examined
The Bacon heresy's influence is evident in the Awadallah
litigation as well as in Judge Mukasey's opinion, as Bacon is cited in
all of these cases. 238 Judge Mukasey and the Second Circuit further
suggest that the constitutionality of incarcerating witnesses is
supported by certain Supreme Court decisions. In fact, none of the
Supreme Court cases on which Judge Mukasey and the Second Circuit
relied holds or even suggests that the prolonged detention of a witness
in the manner authorized by Section 3144 is constitutional. To the
contrary, these cases make clear that the Court has never decided the
question and suggest that the practice in fact is unconstitutional.
Both Judge Mukasey and the Second Circuit heavily relied on
Blair v. United States239 and Stein v. New York. 240 Blair merely
restated the settled rule that a witness who refuses to give a
recognizance may be imprisoned:
And sections 879 and 881, Rev. Stat. (Comp. St. §§ 1490, 1492), contain provisions for
requiring witnesses in criminal proceedings to give recognizance for their appearance to
testify, and for detaining them in prison in default of such recognizance.
In all of these provisions, as in the general law upon the subject, it is clearly
recognized that the giving of testimony and the attendance upon court or grand jury in
order to testify are public duties which every person within the jurisdiction of the
government is bound to perform upon being properly summoned, and for performance2 4of1
which he is entitled to no further compensation than that which the statutes provide.

Blair, therefore, lends no support to the idea that detaining witnesses
innocent of contempt of court is constitutional.
Stein made nothing more than an ambiguous passing reference
to material witnesses and was later repudiated and overruled. The
petitioners in Stein were convicted of felony murder in New York state

236. See Awadallah V, 349 F.3d at 45 (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3144 can be applied to a
grand jury witness and reinstating the indictment against Awadallah for perjury).
237. Id. at 56.
238. Id. at 64; Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp.2d at 290-91, 298-300; Awadallah IV,
202 F. Supp. 2d 82, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Awadallah III, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
239. 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
240. 346 U.S. 156 (1953), overruled by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
241. Blair, 250 U.S. at 281-82 (emphasis added); see also Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S.
578, 588-89 & n.10 (1973) (holding that incarcerating a material witness, and providing him
with nominal compensation, does not violate the Fifth Amendment because the public has an
obligation to the government to provide evidence).
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court: Claiming their confessions were obtained through physical and
psychological coercion, they sought a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that the New York courts' procedure for excluding coerced
confessions was unfair.242 In rejecting their contention of psychological
coercion, the Court noted in dicta:
Interrogation does have social value in solving crime, as physical force does not. By their
own answers many suspects clear themselves, and the information they give frequently
points out another who is guilty. Indeed, interrogation of those who know something
about the facts is the chief means to solution of crime. The duty to disclose knowledge of
crime rests upon all citizens. It is so vital that one known to be innocent may be
detained, in the absence of bail, as a material witness. This Court never has held that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from such detention and interrogation
of a
243
suspect as under the circumstances appears reasonable and not coercive.

Judge Mukasey as well as the Second Circuit interpreted this
vague and desultory reference as an unqualified endorsement by the
Supreme Court of the arrest and indefinite detention of material
witnesses. But that is neither the only possible reading-nor the best
reading-of the quoted passage. By stating that a witness could be
detained "in the absence of bail," the Court could have meant either
that a witness could be detained with no bail being set or that a
witness could be detained if the witness neglected or refused to post
bail that the witness could afford. The idea that the Court was
casually asserting the former proposition is unlikely given the
extensive attention the Court later gave the question of whether
defendants charged with the most serious crimes could be held with no
provision for bail.
In United States v. Salerno,244 a divided Court approved
pretrial detentions of criminal defendants under the Bail Reform Act
of 1984 only because such detentions were (supposedly) carefully
circumscribed:
The Bail Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances under which detention may be
sought to the most serious of crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (detention hearings
available if case involves crimes of violence, offenses for which the sentence is life
imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, or certain repeat offenders). The arrestee
is entitled to a prompt detention hearing, ibid., and the maximum length2 4of5 pretrial
detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act.

If the idea of holding witnesses in pretrial detention without any
provision for bail could be blithely asserted in 1953, then the Court's

242. See Stein, 346 U.S. at 170-76 (arguing, inter alia, that the court's jury instructions
regarding the requirements of a voluntary confession did not meet the requirements demanded
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
243. Id. at 184.

244. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
245. Id. at 747 (footnote omitted).
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protracted discussion of detaining individuals accused of extremely
serious crimes hardly would have been necessary twenty-four years
later.246 It is much more likely therefore that the Stein court was
referring to the practice of detaining witnesses who committed a
contempt of court.
Even if Stein had intimated that a witness who could not afford
bail could be detained, the suggestion would not have been a decision
of the Court. Stein did not involve material witnesses in any way.
Thus, the one sentence that refers to material witnesses provides no
support for the notion that material witnesses can be arrested and
detained. 247 Moreover, Stein itself was overruled eleven years after it
was decided and its reasoning completely repudiated when the Court
held that the New York procedures for excluding coerced confessions
248
from trial in fact did not satisfy due process.
Most illuminating on the meaning of Stein is the fact that the
Supreme Court itself certainly did not believe that Stein made the
broad pronouncement that Judge Mukasey and the Second Circuit
ascribed to it. Just six years after Stein, the Court expressly stated in
New York v. O'Neill249 that the issue of whether material witnesses
could be held without bail had never been decided, and the Court then
declined to rule on it. The respondent in O'Neill challenged his
extradition from Florida to New York to testify as a witness before a
grand jury. Florida and New York were among the states that had
enacted the Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, legislation for the

246. Stein, 346 U.S. at 184 & n.26. It is not clear that the detention of witnesses was any
more permissible under New York law than under federal law. See People ex rel. Troy v. Pettit,
19 Misc. 280, 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1897) ("[H]ad the relator offered to enter into a written
undertaking... without sureties, it would have been the duty of the magistrate to have accepted
the same without committing him to the county jail."). Thus, the Stein court's citation to both the
New York material witness statute and the former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(b) is
further evidence that the Court was merely making the noncontroversial statement that a
witness who refuses to post bail can be incarcerated.
247. See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 557 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Judicial decisions do not stand as binding 'precedent' for points that were not raised, not
argued, and hence not analyzed."); Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) ("Questions which
merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to
be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents."); Nat'l Cable Television
Ass'n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, 937 F.2d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("'hen an issue is not
argued or is ignored in a decision, such decision is not precedent to be followed in a subsequent
case in which the issue arises.").
248. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 390-91 (1964) (holding that procedures for
excluding coerced confessions must be "fully adequate to insure a reliable and clear-cut
determination of the voluntariness of the confession").
249. 359 U.S. 1, 8 (1959).
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reciprocal extradition of witnesses. 250 That statute provided that, upon
presentation of a certificate from a judge in the requesting state, a
judge in the requested state could do one of two things:
He could have notified the prospective witness of a hearing to determine whether or not
the witness should be subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury in New York. On the
other hand, in view of the recommendation that the witness be taken into custody, the
judge could have directed that the witness be immediately brought before him and then,
if the judge was "satisfied of the desirability" that the witness should be placed in
custody and delivered to an officer of the2State
of New York, he could have followed that
51
procedure instead of issuing a subpoena.

Unlike Mr. Awadallah, Mr. O'Neill was never jailed. 252 He was
initially released on bond pending a hearing. After the hearing, the
Florida Circuit Court judge concluded that the law was
unconstitutional for three reasons: 1) it violated the right of ingress
and egress across state lines, 2) it required the Florida court to issue
an extraterritorial subpoena, and 3) it failed to provide for bail. 253 The
Florida Circuit Court characterized the failure to provide bail as "the
most serious objection to the constitutionality" of the statute, noting
with some alarm that the statute "attempts to authorize any court of
record to order a citizen to be arrested, seized and held without
bail ... .,,254 The court found the part of the statute authorizing the
'255
detention of witnesses "clearly unconstitutional and void.
On appeal, neither the Florida Supreme Court nor the United
States Supreme Court considered whether the failure to provide bail
rendered the statute unconstitutional. Rather, both courts considered
only the first ground on which the statute was invalidated-i.e.,
whether the statute discriminated against citizens of states traveling
to Florida in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 256 The
U.S. Supreme Court made clear that, if a witness were confined
without any provision for bail he or she could meet, the statute might
very well violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
(which incorporated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
unreasonable seizures):

250. See id. at 3-4 (reversing the Circuit Court's decisions and holding that the statute was
unconstitutional); New York v. O'Neill, 100 So.2d 149, 153 (Fla. 1958) (describing the Florida
statute).
251. O'Neill, 100 So.2d at 153.
252. Also unlike Mr. Awadallah, Mr. O'Neill had been asked to appear voluntarily in New
York to testify and had refused. Id. at 151.
253. Id. at 154-55.
254. In re O'Neill, 9 Fla. Supp. 153, 161 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1956).
255. Id. at 162.
256. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1959); O'Neill, 100 So.2d at 154-55.
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The more relevant challenge to the statute invalidated by the Supreme Court of Florida
is that it denies due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment .... The
Circuit Court of Dade County ruled that the absence of any provision for bail in the
procedure of apprehension and delivery violated due process of law. Since the Supreme
Court of Florida expressly refrained from ruling whether the failure of the statute to
provide for bail for persons attached and delivered violated either the Florida
Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment, and since silence on bail is not tantamount
to proscription of bail, the claim that this silence of the statute is a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a hypothetical question which need not now be considered.We
may add that the sole claim before us, as it was the sole claim dealt with by the
Supreme Court of Florida, is that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. No claim is
before us that the administration
of the statute in the particular circumstances of this
257
case violates due process.

O'Neill thus made it clear that the Court was not deciding and
had never decided the constitutionality of incarcerating "material
witnesses" with no provision for bail that they could afford. 258 Indeed,
if the Court had decided that material witness detentions were
constitutional, there would have been no reason for it to emphasize in
Hurtado that "the petitioners do not attack the constitutionality of
incarcerating material witnesses ....,,259 The Second Circuit was
wrong therefore to assert in Awadallah that "the detention of material
witnesses for the purpose of securing grand jury testimony has
withstood constitutional challenge. 2 6 °
Lest any doubt remain, Justice Douglas's dissent in O'Neill
cements the notion that the Court did not consider the legality of
detaining a witness without provision for bail. Focusing, like the
majority, mainly on the right of ingress and egress from states, Justice
Douglas tellingly wrote:
The harshness of this procedure is emphasized by a feature of this extradition law on
which the Florida Supreme Court has not yet passed. The New York statute gives the
witness who is extradited only $5 a day for his maintenance in New York, a sum plainly
26 1
inadequate in light of today's cost of living.

257. O'Neill, 359 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also O'Neill, 100 So.2d at
153 ("In the circumstances it seems to be our obligation to decide the constitutionality of Sec.
942.02 . . . whether the procedure be to seize and deliver a witness or to place him under
subpoena.").
258. To the contrary, courts have interpreted O'Neill as requiring that witnesses be given a
hearing to contest their obligation to appear in another state. See, e.g., In re Rhode Island Grand
Jury Subpoena, 605 N.E.2d 840, 848 (Mass. 1993) (emphasizing witness's right to a "full hearing'
guaranteed by O'Neill); Vermont v. Emrick, 282 A.2d 821 (Vt. 1971) (stating that extradition of
witness is a "drastic procedure" and due process must be satisfied per O'Neill). Section 3144 does
not provide any analogous safeguard.
259. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588 (1973).
260. Awadallah V, 349 F.3d 42, 56 (2d Cir. 2003). Interestingly, the Bacon court did not
mention O'Neill. If O'Neill in fact held what the Second Circuit claimed it held in Awadallah V,
the Ninth Circuit would have been expected to cite to it in Bacon.
261. O'Neill, 359 U.S. at 18 n.6 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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The cost of living would obviously not have been a consideration had it
been suggested to Justice Douglas that Mr. O'Neill would be staying
in a prison while in New York. Justice Douglas, like the majority,
considered only whether Mr. O'Neill could be legally required to travel
to New York. The issue of detaining Mr. O'Neill in a prison-as Mr.
Awadallah was-was neither contemplated nor decided.
Fourteen years later, when Justice Douglas confronted a case
in which material witnesses were imprisoned without provision for
bail, he made it clear that he believed it was unconstitutional to
secure the attendance of witnesses with anything more than their
personal recognizances. Despite the fact that the issue was not before
the Court, Justice Douglas proceeded in Hurtado, the case brought by
detained Mexican immigrants seeking to recover witness fees, to
examine the constitutionality of detaining material witnesses. He
determined that the detention of the Mexicans as "material witnesses"
262
violated due process and equal protection:
It is possible to read former Rule 46(b) as permitting release on personal recognizance.
But experience has shown that judges have not so read it. The result, as I indicate in
this opinion, is that former Rule 46(b) has borne down heavily on indigents who would
be good risks but could not put up the money to buy a bail bond. Former Rule 46(b) as
so
263
construed-and as applied in the present case-is therefore plainly unconstitutional.

Justice Douglas forcefully concluded that the Court should enjoin the
further detention of the petitioners:
"[N]o man should be denied release (pending trial or judicial review) because of
indigence." This principle seems ever clearer and more forceful to me in circumstances
where the imprisoned have not been charged with or convicted of a crime. We cannot
allow the Government's insistent reference to these Mexican citizens as "deportable
aliens" to obscure the fact that they come before us as innocent persons who have not
been charged with a crime or incarcerated in anticipation of a criminal prosecution. It is
true, of course, that petitioners do not challenge the constitutionality of confining a
material witness. But, in their prayer for relief, they seek to enjoin the Government
"from any further incarceration of any person under such rule under the present
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1821 at one dollar ($1.00) per day total payment." I

262. To buttress his argument that the constitutionality of Section 3144 is beyond question,
Judge Mukasey added this notation to his opinion:
Even Justice Brennan's dissent in Hurtado, based in part on constitutional
considerations, did not question the propriety of imprisoning material witnesses, but
maintained that they should be compensated under the statute providing for
compensation of witnesses, and that a failure to do so denied those witnesses due process.
In re Application for U.S. Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 299 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). Judge Mukasey apparently did not read the other dis"senting opinion in the case.
263. Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 601 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Interestingly,
almost a century earlier, the Supreme Court of Minnesota had avoided the constitutional issue
by interpreting its state material witness statute in just this way. See supra text accompanying
notes 182-185.
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conclude that petitioners are entitled to this relief unless they are released on their
264
personal recognizance.

There is no support in any Supreme Court case for the
prolonged or indefinite detention of "material witnesses" under
Section 3144. On the contrary, Supreme Court case law suggests that
the practice is unconstitutional.
The Second Circuit in Awadallah also relied on several of its
own decisions interpreting the New York state material witness
statute. None of these decisions is relevant to the constitutionality of
Section 3144 because the New York statute in effect when those cases
were decided differed from Section 3144 in two constitutionally
significant respects. First, like the early federal material witness
statutes, the New York law allowed the jailing of a witness only "upon
his neglect or refusal. . . to enter a written undertaking, with such
sureties and in such sum as he may deem proper, to the effect that he
will appear and testify at the court. ''265 This meant that only a witness
who committed a contempt of court by refusing to give recognizance or
post a bond that he could afford could be imprisoned. Second, the New
York statute gave the witness a right to a hearing to contest his or her
status as a "material witness. '266 The courts of New York repeatedly
expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of detaining a witness who
could not afford the bail set and insisted on strict compliance with the
statute to prevent suspects from being held as "witnesses":
Whether constitutional or not, about which we express no opinion, the statute is harsh,
and carries interference with personal liberty to an extreme limit. Strict compliance
with its provisions should7 be exacted. Its use for purposes plainly beyond its scope
26
should not be permitted.

Cases since September 11th in which material-witness
detainees have challenged the federal government's authority to
imprison them have not carefully analyzed the constitutionality of the
practice. The courts simply asserted that the constitutionality of the
264. Id. at 604 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
265. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 618-b (Thompson 1958).
266. The statute provided that the judge could act with respect to a witness only "after an
opportunity has been given to such person to appear before such judge and be heard in
opposition thereto." N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 618-b (Thompson 1958).
267. In re Prestigiacomo, 255 N.Y.S. 289, 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932) (citations omitted); see
also New York ex rel. Fusco (Galgano) v. Ryan, 124 N.Y.S.2d 690, 694 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953)
(holding that a witness must be provided counsel for pre-commitment hearing if he so requests
and arguing that "in consonance with and in protection of our democratic way of life, we must
not permit ourselves to be beguiled into acceptance of the guiding thesis of the cynical
totalitarian that 'the end justifies the means'...."); New York ex rel. Maloney v. Sheriff of Kings
County, 192 N.Y.S. 553, 555 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 1921) (declaring statute unconstitutional because as
amended in 1915 it allowed for sureties to be required even when there was no indication that
witness would not honor recognizance).
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practice has long been settled. However, none of the authorities these
courts invoked in approving these detentions supports the
government's claimed power to detain these individuals. On the
contrary, the Supreme Court expressly stated as late as 1959 that the
question had never been decided, and Justice Douglas would have
found it unconstitutional in 1973 had the Court reached the issue.
VI. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

Since September 1 1th, the Department of Justice has exercised
the purported authority to detain individuals for extended and
indefinite periods without probable cause to believe they committed a
crime. DOJ has repeatedly asserted for itself the power to jail
purportedly suspicious people on scant evidence under severe
conditions until law enforcement agents were satisfied of their
innocence. The federal courts have acquiesced in the practice of jailing
"material witnesses" because of the misconception that it has long
been permissible. This is not a situation in which the government is
merely being heavy-handed; it is a radical and fundamental violation
of the Fourth Amendment's most basic protections.
Section 3144 is facially unconstitutional because "no set of
circumstances exists under which" it is legitimate to arrest someone
who has not committed and is not committing a crime. 268 The Supreme
Court has long interpreted the Fourth Amendment as prohibiting
arrests not supported by probable cause to believe the arrestee
committed or imminently will commit a crime. 269 Accordingly, the

268. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Salerno suggests three arguments
independent of the Fourth Amendment that Section 3144 is facially unconstitutional. Id. The
statute violates procedural due process because it authorizes the government to deprive innocent
individuals of their liberty based on arbitrary criteria lacking any relationship to the ends the
statute is meant to achieve. Id. It violates substantive due process because it requires that those
arrested be enjoined from committing any future violation of law, effectively depriving them of
the presumption of innocence with respect to any alleged future crimes. Id. Finally, it violates
the Eighth Amendment Bail Clause because it authorizes conditions of release or detention that
are not narrowly tailored to achieve the statute's purpose. Id. These arguments are not
developed in this Article only because the government's use of the statute for investigatory
purposes after September 1 1th is such an archetypical Fourth Amendment violation.
269. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (noting that the "requirement of
probabl[e] cause has roots that are deep in our history"); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37
(1979) (stating that "[t]his Court repeatedly has explained that 'probable cause' to justify an
arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to
warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances show,
that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense"); Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-14 (1975) (stating that the "Fourth Amendment requires a judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following
arrest"); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15-17 (1948) (noting that the arrest could only
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general rule is that seizures not based on probable cause to believe
that the arrestee committed a crime are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. 270 While there are some exceptions to that
general rule, none of them justifies the detention of innocent witnesses
in a criminal case prosecuted by civilian authorities.
Even in those cases in which the Supreme Court has approved
seizures on a showing of less than probable cause, it has nearly always
required a showing of individualized suspicion of involvement in
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio,271 the first case to permit a seizure on
less than probable cause, emphasized the fact that the officer who
stopped and frisked the defendant had an objective basis to believe the
defendant was about to commit a robbery and might well be armed:
[T]he story is quite different where, as here, two men hover about a street corner for an
extended period of time, at the end of which it becomes apparent that they are not
waiting for anyone or anything; where these men pace alternately along an identical
route, pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where each
completion of this route is followed immediately by a conference between the two men
on the corner; where they are joined in one of these conferences by a third man who
leaves swiftly; and where the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of
blocks away. It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years'
experience in the detection of thievery from2 stores in this same neighborhood to have
27
failed to investigate this behavior further.

The Court also emphasized that Terry should not provide an occasion
to disregard the usual probable cause standard in cases not justified
by similar facts. 2 73 Thus, even taking Terry stops into consideration,
the general rule remains that seizures not justified by objective
suspicion that the person seized is involved in the commission of a
274
crime are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
In a few cases, the Supreme Court has allowed very brief
seizures without individualized suspicion for purposes unrelated to
criminal law enforcement. For example, the Court has approved
27 6
highway checkpoints to intercept illegal aliens 275 and drunk drivers.
be lawful if a crime was committed in the presence of the arresting officer or if the officer had
reasonable cause to believe the defendant was guilty of a crime).
270. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981) (stating that "every arrest, and
every seizure having the attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is supported by
probable cause").
271. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
272. Id. at 23.
273. Id. at 20 ("[T]he notions which underlie both the warrant procedure and the
requirement of probable cause remain fully relevant in this context.").
274. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (stating that "a search or
seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing").
275. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (holding that "stops for
brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment").
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However, the outcome in those cases depended upon the very brief and
minimally intrusive nature of the stop and the idea that automobiles
are accorded less protection under the Fourth Amendment than
houses or people. 277 These cases in no way support either the arrest or
prolonged detention of a "material witness." In fact, the Court has
emphasized that even brief, suspicionless stops of automobiles are not
'278
permitted "to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.
Additionally, the Court has categorically held that individuals cannot
be held longer than forty-eight hours without a judicial determination
of probable cause that they were involved in a crime. 279 And an
individual may never be detained for any period of time "for the
purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest," a
constitutional ruling that DOJ has circumvented with "material
28 0
witness" warrants.
The Supreme Court has sanctioned extended deprivations of
liberty without probable cause only in a few extreme and controversial
circumstances-illustrating
how extraordinary the power the
government claims under the material witness statute is. Most
infamously, the Court approved the relocation during World War II of
all persons of Japanese ancestry from their homes on the West Coast
281
to camps pursuant to the President's and Congress's war powers.
The Korematsu Court reasoned that an individualized inquiry into the
loyalty of each Japanese person on the West Coast was not possible
28 2
and the internment therefore was justified by military necessity.
Similarly, in Ludecke v. Watkins, the Court held that the petitioner,
an "enemy alien," could be arrested and removed from the country
without judicial inquiry during a state of war. 28 3 The Court reasoned

276. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990) (holding that "[t]he
intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes
indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuerte").
277. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (noting that "the measure of intrusion on motorists stopped
briefly at checkpoints" is minimal); Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 557-58 (noting the stop intrudes
on rights only "to a limited extent" and "involves only a brief detention").
278. City of Indianapolis,531 U.S. at 41.
279. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991) (stating that if an
individual does not get a probable cause hearing in forty-eight hours, the government must
demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency).
280. Id. at 56.
281. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944) (noting that under the
conditions of modern warfare "the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened
danger").
282. Id. at 218-19.
283. 335 U.S. 160, 164, 170 (1948).
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that judicial review of the President's wartime powers under the Alien
28 5
Enemy Act of 1789284 was barred.
Both Korematsu and Ludecke were predicated upon the
latitude accorded to the Executive Branch in the conduct of war in
dealing with potentially dangerous aliens. Section 3144, in contrast, is
aliens,
targets
dangerous
that
wartime
measure
not
a
notwithstanding the fact that DOJ has used the statute to further the
investigation of horrific terrorist attacks. Unlike the orders to relocate
the Japanese on the West Coast and to remove a German citizen from
the United States, "material witness" warrants issued under Section
3144 are ordinary warrants issued by federal district courts. Enacted
in 1984, the statute is not a wartime measure but an ordinary statute
applicable to all criminal proceedings and reaching American citizens,
like Brandon Mayfield and Maher Hawash, as well as aliens, like
Mohammed Bellahouel.
Whatever vitality the Korematsu and Ludecke decisions may
have in the context of the war on terrorism, they do not support the
prolonged or indefinite detention of witnesses under Section 3144. The
pretextual detention of individuals on the basis that they may have
information relevant to an investigation but are not themselves
dangerous has no basis or precedent. 28 6 Moreover, in the context of the
present war on terrorism, the Court recently retreated from
Korematsu and held that due process requires that an American
citizen held as an "enemy combatant" be given meaningful opportunity
to contest that designation. 28 7 The Hamdi Court cited to Justice
Murphy's dissenting opinion in Korematsu for the proposition that
even military claims of the need to detain an individual must be
28 8
subjected to judicial scrutiny.
VII. CONCLUSION
No federal court, no prosecutor, no agent has the authority to
imprison a witness who promises to discharge his or her duty to
testify. The prevailing assumption both before and after the terrorist
attacks of September 11th that witnesses can be held in prison

284. 50 U.S.C.A. § 21 (2005).
285. Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 164, 170.
286. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (affirming states' power to institutionalize
dangerous mentally ill people both to provide care and to protect the community).
287. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004) (considering the constitutional
procedures that are owed to an American citizen who is detained on U.S. soil and labeled an
"enemy combatant").
288. Id. at 2649-50.
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without provision of bail they can meet has no legal foundation. It is
based on an interpretation of historical practice and of the
Constitution's text that is fundamentally and demonstrably flawed.
Nonetheless, it has provided the Department of Justice with a means
of imprisoning people it deems suspicious as "material witnesses"
while it investigates their supposed terrorist ties. Not surprisingly,
the information that has surfaced despite DOJ's obsessive efforts to
keep the detentions secret indicates that the tactic has been largely
ineffective. Nearly all of the "material witness" detainees have been
found, like Brandon Mayfield, to have no terrorist ties.
These arrests, which commentators have decried as "abuses" of
the material witness statute, are much worse than ill-advised or
heavy-handed excesses. They are the very arrests that the Fourth
Amendment is meant to bar. Moreover, Section 3144 is a generally
applicable criminal statute. So, as long as the misconception of its
constitutionality persists, there is nothing to stop DOJ from arresting
innocent individuals as "material witnesses" in investigations outside
of the terrorism context. Indeed, if DOJ has already done that, there
may be no way to know.
At least as disquieting as the government's roundup of
innocents is the inadequacy of judicial scrutiny and skepticism that
has met the dragnet. The few published accounts of "material witness"
detentions since September 1 1th reveal not only an overreaching
Executive, but also a dangerously credulous Judiciary. Unlike prior
detentions without individualized probable cause findings, like the
internment camps sustained in Korematsu, the power to incarcerate
that courts are allowing the government under Section 3144 will not
be confined by time or circumstance. The prevailing and erroneous
belief that so-called "material witnesses" can be detained without bail
on the same terms as criminal defendants is a potentially perpetual
threat to the Fourth Amendment's most fundamental guarantee.

Purging Foreseeability
W. Jonathan Cardi

58 Vand. L. Rev. 739 (2005)

The concept of foreseeability is central to most courts'
resolution of negligence cases. Foreseeability's substance is
indistinct, however, and its role in the elements of duty, breach, and
proximate cause is elusive.
This Article offers an account of
foreseeability in negligence,cases and urges that foreseeability's role
in duty is doctrinally redundant.
The Article then suggests that a seemingly innocuous general
duty provision of the Restatement (Third) of Torts would, if adopted
by courts, effectively purge foreseeability from the element of duty,
shifting foreseeability's influence in negligence cases entirely to the
context of breach and proximate cause.
The most important
byproduct of this doctrinal change, the Article argues, is the
potentialfor a significant shift in power from judge to jury.
Finally, the Article explores the normative efficacy of such a
revolution in negligence jurisprudence. The purging of foreseeability
from courts' considerations of duty is undoubtedly, the Article
asserts, a boon for the rule of law. Furthermore,any resulting shift
in power from judge to jury is sensible and consistent with historical
understandings of their respective roles. Lastly, although the
proposed doctrinal change is significant and favorable, the Article
maintains that the change will not likely alter the substantive
outcome of a majority of negligence cases.

